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THE MARKETING OF FARM PRODUCTS UNDER SOME
OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATUTES*
NEiL BRoOKS**

The regulation of the marketing of agricultural products has been
marked by variability and diversity throughout the history of our
country. In the early period, numerous regulative measures relative to the marketing of farm products were made effective by the

municipalities1 and the States.2 Under present-day conditions of
industrialization numerous statutes have been enacted by Congress,
under the commerce clause of the Constitution, in order to promote
the orderly marketing of farm products, to contribute to the economic stability and prosperity of the Nation, and in some instances
to safeguard against unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, and unfit
food, and also to prevent the introduction and spread of insect pests,
plant diseases, and infectious or communicable diseases among livestock and poultry.8
The ties or relationships among markets in the recent decades of
great expansion in mass production and distribution reflect the wide
variety of markets, the complex system of distribution, and the comOThis article is based on an address delivered in Oolumbia, South Carolina, on November 6, 1958, as a part of the program, under the auspices of the Bar Association of South
Carolina, at the Institute on Federal Legislation.
The author is Associate Solicitor in the United States Department of Agriculture.
The views expressed herein are not intended to be inconsistent with official opinion in
the United States Department of Agriculture, but nothing herein is to be construed as
sxpressing any official views of the Department.

1. See, e. g., State ex rel. Wilkinson v. City of Charleston, 2 Speers 523
[old volume, 622], 525-526 [old volume, 625-626] (S. C. 1843); Mayor and
Aldermen of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 139-143 (1841); City of Cartersville
v. McGinnis, 142 Ga. 71, 72-78, 82 S.E. 487, 488-491 (1914) ; City of Chicago
v. Bowman Dairy, 234 Ill. 294, 297-301, 84 N.E. 913, 914-916 (1908) ; Deems
v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 164, 170-175, 30 Atl. 648, 649-651 (1894) ; Commonwealth
v. Waite, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 264, 265-266 (1865) ; People v. Vandecarr, 175
N. Y. 440, 444-445, 67 N.E. 913, 913-914 (1903), affirned sub nora. Lieberman
v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 557-563 (1905) ; Wartman v. City of Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 202, 209-210 (1854).
2. See, e. g., Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58, 60-65, 44 Am. Rep. 128, 129-134
(1880); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123-132 (1876); Turner v. Maryland,
107 U.S. 38, 39-58 (1882) ; Broadnax v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285, 289-296 (1911) ;
Merchant's Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 365, 366-368 (1919); Pacific States
Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 181 (1935).
3. See, e. g., 33 STAT. 1269 (1905), 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 141 et seq.; 37 STAT.
315 (1912), 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 151 et seq.; 39 STAT. 486 (1916), 7 U.S.C.
1952 ed. § 241 et seq.; 42 STAT. 159 (1921), 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 181 et seq.;
44 STAT. 1355 (1927), 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 491; 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499a et seq.; 48 STAT. 31 (1933), as amended 7 U S C
1952 ed. § 601 et seq.; 49 STAT. 781 (1935), 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 851 et seq.;
52 STAT. 31 (1938), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1281 et seq.; 61 STAT.
922 (1947), 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1100 et seq.
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mercialization of our economy.4 The major agricultural commodities are generally distributed on a Nation-wide market,5 and our
position as a world power in international trade affords an even
broader basis of public interest in the marts of trade and commerce. 6
The statutes which have been designated for discussion in this
article are the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,7 the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,8 the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921,9 and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities
Act of 1930.10
I.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 was enacted by Congress to promote, foster, and maintain the orderly marketing of
cotton, tobacco, wheat, corn, rice, and peanuts in interstate and
foreign commerce, and inter alia to provide an adequate and balanced
flow of these commodities in commerce."
Marketing quotas, within
prescribed limits and by prescribed standards, may be established
for these commodities so as to achieve the economic goal of the
statute. The Congress made numerous legislative findings relative
to the marketing, in interstate and foreign commerce, of each of
these agricultural commodities, 12 e. g., the statute contains the legislative finding that:
4. It has been said: "Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago
may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the Nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the times." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,

641 (1937).
5. See, e. g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 515-516 (1922); Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1939); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47 (1939);
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533, 549-550 (1939); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-126 (1942) ; Edwards v. United States, 91 F. 2d
767, 777 (9th Cir. 1937) ; Troppy v. La Sara Farmers Gin Co., 113 F. 2d 350,
352 (5th Cir. 1940).
6. Approximately 27 million tons of agricultural products were exported by
ocean carriers in 1951 (computed from Commercial Statistics, Water-Borne
Commerce of the United States for the Calendar Year 1951, Annual Report of
the Chief of Engineers, 1952 (Dept. Army), Part 2, Table 2, pp. xx-xxv).
Annual exports of wheat are affected by foreign production and import restrictions (Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-126 (1942) ), and the volume
of sugar moving to the continental United States market is controlled, by the
familiar device of a quota system, in order to secure a harmonious relation between supply and demand (Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Co., 338
U.S. 604, 605-606 (1950)).
7. 52 STAT. 31 (1938), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 12 1 et seq.
8. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), as amended, and as re-enacted and amended, 50 STAT.
246 (1937), 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 601 et seq.
9. 42 STAT. 159 (1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 181 et seq.
10. 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499a et seq.
11. 52 STAT. 31 (1938), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1282 and 1357.
12. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1311, 1321, 1331, 1341, 1351, 1357.
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American cotton is a basic source of clothing and industrial
products used by every person in the United States and by sub-

stantial numbers of people in foreign countries. American cotton is sold on a world-wide market and moves from the places
of production almost entirely in interstate and foreign commerce
to processing establishments located throughout the world at
places outside the State where the cotton is produced.
Fluctuations in supplies of cotton and the marketing of exces-

sive supplies of cotton in interstate and foreign commerce disrupt the orderly marketing of cotton in such commerce with
consequent injury to and destruction of such commerce. Excessive supplies of cotton directly and materially affect the
volume of cotton moving in interstate and foreign commerce
and cause disparity in prices of cotton and industrial products
moving in interstate and foreign commerce with consequent
diminution of the volume of such commerce in industrial products.
The conditions affecting the production and marketing of
cotton are such that, without Federal assistance, farmers, individually or in cooperation, cannot effectively prevent the recurrence of excessive supplies of cotton and fluctuations in supplies, cannot prevent indiscriminate dumping of excessive supplies
on the Nation-wide and foreign markets, cannot maintain normal carry-overs of cotton, and cannot provide for the orderly
marketing of cotton in interstate and foreign commerce.
It is in the interest of the general welfare that interstate
and foreign commerce in cotton be protected from the burdens
caused by the marketing of excessive supplies of cotton in such
commerce, that a supply of cotton be maintained which is adequate to meet domestic consumption and export requirements
in years of drought, flood, and other adverse conditions as well
as in years of plenty, and that the soil resources of the Nation
be not wasted in the production of excessive supplies of cotton.
The provisions of this part affording a cooperative plan to
cotton producers are necessary and appropriate to prevent the
burdens on interstate and foreign commerce caused by the marketing in such commerce of excessive supplies, and to promote,
foster, and maintain an orderly flow of an adequate supply of
cotton in such commerce. 18
13. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1341.
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The Act is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to regulate
14
commerce among the several states and with foreign nations.
"[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception,
but a practical one, drawn from the course of business."' 5 The
term "market", as defined in the statute, includes the conventional
meaning of the term and also certain local activities and uses,16 and
the statute provides for the regulation of the marketing of the basic
agricultural commodities. But local activity, whatever its nature,
may be subject to regulation, under the commerce clause of the
Constitution, if the local activity exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce. 17 The Congress has plenary authority, under the commerce clause in the Constitution, to regulate those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce as to make
regulation of the intrastate activities appropriate in the effective
regulation of interstate commerce. 8
The statutory plan for marketing quotas authorizes the establishment of quotas for the basic agricultural commodities, enumerated
in the Act, only when the Secretary has found that supplies are
excessive as defined in the Act. 19 The quotas will not be made effective, however, if more than one-third of the farmers voting in a referendum oppose quotas.2 0 If the farmers producing a particular crop
approve the national quota, the Act provides for allotting to each
farm its fair share of the quota.
The statutory provisions for the establishment of acreage allotments and marketing quotas are different for the various crops, but
the general principles of the basic plans are similar. The provisions
applicable to tobacco may, for the purpose of this abbreviature,
serve as an example. The Act provides for the establishment by
the Secretary of Agriculture of a national marketing quota for tobacco, 2 1 for the apportionment of the national marketing quota
14. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-129 (1942); Mulford v. Smith,

307 U.S. 38, 47-51 (1939) ; Troppy v. La Sara Farmers Gin Co., 113 F. 2d 350,

351-352 (5th Cir. 1940).

15. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).

16. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1301(6) (A), Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118119 (1942).
17. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942 ).
18. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-197 (U.S. 1824); Swift & Co. v

United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396-398 (1905) ; Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S.
342, 351 (1914); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119

(1942); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-129 (1942); Connecticut Co.

v. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 515, 535-536 (1945) ; Mabee v. White Plains Pub.

Co., 327 U.S. 178, 181-184 (1946).
19. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1312(a), 1322(a), 1335, 1340, 1342, 1352, 1358(a).

20. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1312(b), 1322(d), 1336, 1343, 1354(b), 1358(b).
21. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1312(a). The Secretary is required, inter alla, to
proclaim "a national marketing quota for each marketing year for each kind of
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among States "on the basis of the total production of tobacco in each
State during the five calendar years immediately preceding the
calendar year in which the quota is proclaimed" with certain adjustments for specific conditions,2 2 for the conversion of the State marketing quota into a State acreage allotment on the basis of the average yield per acre of tobacco for the State during the five years
preceding the proclamation of the national marketing quota, adjusted
for abnormal conditions of production,28 and for the allotment of
the State acreage allotment among the farms on which tobacco is
produced.2 4 The allotments to the farms are determined by the
Secretary of Agriculture through local committees of farmers and
on the basis of factors specified in the Act 2 5 and the regulations
issued by the Secretary. 26
The statute provides for the allotment of the quota for any State
among the farms, on which tobacco is produced, on the basis of the
following factors: "Past marketing of tobacco, making due allowance for drought, flood, hail, other abnormal weather conditions,
plant bed, and other diseases; land, labor, and equipment available
for the production of tobacco; crop rotation practices; and the
soil and other physical factors affecting the production of tobacco
* * * ."27 The Act does not specify the percentage or quantitative
share that each factor must have in the fixing of quotas. Here, as in
Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Co., 28 "Congress did not
predetermine the periods of time to which the [statutory] standards
29
should be related or the respective weights to be accorded them,"
and there is a wide area for administrative discretion. The regulations provide for a preliminary farm-acreage allotment for old farms,
and for the preliminary allotment to be increased or decreased in
view of various circumstances, and a method is provided for establishing acreage allotments for new farms.3 0
tobacco for which a national marketing quota was proclaimed for the immediately preceding marketing year," and also the Secretary "shall proclaim a national marketing quota for Virginia sun-cured tobacco for each marketing year
for which a quota is proclaimed for fire-cured tobacco." Ibid.
22. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1313 (a).
23. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1313 (g).
24. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1313(b) and (g).

25. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1313(b), (c), and (g), and 1388.

26. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1375.

27. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1313(b).

28. 338 U.S. 604, 613 (1950).

29. Ibid.
30. See, e. g., 16 Fed. Reg. 7921 (1951), 7 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 726.316726.319 (Cum. Supp. 1952); 16 Fed. Reg. 9347 (1951), 7 Code Fed. Regs.
§§ 725.316-725.319 (Cum. Supp. 1952). Marketing quota regulations are issued for each marketing year.
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The actual production of the acreage allotment established for a
farm is the marketing quota for that farm. 1 The allotment "is made
to the farm and not to the person who owns or operates the farm
and therefore runs with the land", 2 and it is necessary for the County Committee to apportion an allotment whenever a farm is divided
into two or more farms; and the regulations do not permit a division
of the allotment to be based on an agreement, oral or written, between the parties.3 3 The regulations for each marketing year contain definitions of "farm," "cropland," and other significant terms;
and "farm" has been defined as "all adjacent or nearby farm land
under the same ownership which is operated by one person," including also any "other adjacent or nearby farm land which the county
committee . .. determines is operated by the same person as part
of the same unit with respect to the rotation of crops and with workstock, farm machinery, and labor substantially separate from that
for any other lands . .. ." and any "field-rented tract . . . which, together with any other land included in the farm, constitutes a unit
with respect to the rotation of crops."M The Act provides for a
penalty for each pound of tobacco marketed in excess of the marketing quota for the farm.3 5
Farm acreage allotments are established by a County Committee
in each county elected by the farmers in the county, 6 and notice of
the "farm marketing quota of his farm shall be mailed to the farmer."37 Any farmer who is dissatisfied with the acreage allotment for
his farm may have it reviewed by the local- Review Committee composed of three farmers designated by the Secretary of Agriculture,
and such review is obtained by the filing of an application for review
within 15 days after the date of the mailing of the notice of allotment
for the farm.38 Otherwise the original determination of the County
Committee is final. 39 If a farmer is dissatisfied with the determination
of the Review Committee he may have the determination reviewed
by the courts.4 0 The Act authorizes such judicial review in the
United States District Court, for the district in which the farm is
located, or by a proceeding ". . . in any court of record of the State
having general jurisdiction, sitting in the county or the district in
31. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1313(g).
32. Lee v. Berry, 219 S.C. 346, 351, 65 S.E. 2d 257, 259 (1951).
33. See, e.g. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 725.321 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
34. 7 Code Ked. Regs. § 725.312(b) (Cure. Supp. 1952).
35. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1314(a).
36. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1313(b), (c), and (g), and 1388.
37. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1362.
38. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1363.

39. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1363.
40. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1365.
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The scope of
which his [the plaintiff's] farm is located ....
judicial review is limited to "questions of law," and "the findings
of fact by the Review Committee, if supported by evidence, shall be
conclusive."' 42 These terms in the Act "provide the usual provisions
for Court review of administrative orders." 43 This is the familiar
substantial evidence rule which governs judicial review under numerous Federal statutes having provisions comparable to the relevant
Judicial review under this statute is not a
section of this Ac. 4
"commonplace one" in which the Court is clothed with its ordinary
jurisdiction, legal or equitable, but it is a special statutory proceeding in which jurisdiction extends "only to review the action of the
review committee" on the basis of the evidence in the record as a
45
whole before that Committee.

The guiding principle for judicial review under the statute was set
forth by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Lee v. Berry46 and
Lee v. DeBerryY' "The Court is directed to affirm the determination
of the Review Committee if its findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence," and substantial evidence means "only such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion."' 48 The rule in the Berry and DeBerry cases
has been followed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Rymer
v. Garnett.49 Moreover, "it is not the Court's function to substitute
its judgment for that of the Review Committee where the Committee
has applied the broad phrases" in the regulations "to a specific state
of facts .
"50
,
The requirement in the Marketing Quota Review Regulations5 l
that the determination of the Review Committee should be based
upon "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence adduced at the
41. Ibid.

42. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1366.
43. H. Conf. Rep. No. 1767, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 92 (1938).
44. See, e. g., the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 45(c),
which provides that the "findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." Comparable language in another
statute was applied in Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
It was said in Labor Board v. Waterman S. S. Co., 309 U.S. 206, 208-209
(1940), that: "Not by accident, but in line with a general policy, Congress
has deemed it wise to entrust the finding of facts to these specialized agencies.
It is essential that courts regard this division of responsibility which Congress as
a matter of policy has embodied in the very statute from which the court of
Appeals derived its jurisdiction to act."
45. Smith Land Co. v. Christensen, 148 F. 2d 184, 185 (10th Cir. 1945).
46. 219 S.C. 346, 352, 65 S.E. 2d 257, 259 (1951).
47. 219 S.C. 382, 387-388, 65 S.E. 2d 775, 777 (1951).
48. Lee v. DeBerry, 219 S.C. 382, 387, 65 S.E. 2d 775, 777 (1951).
49. 244 S.W. 2d 439, 440 (Ky. 1951).
50. Lee v. DeBerry, 219 S.C. 382, 393, 65 S.E. 2d 775, 780 (1951).
51. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.30(b) (1949 ed.).
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hearing" merely incorporates the language of § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 52 That provision in the regulations does
not, however, change the scope of judicial review because § 10(e)
of the Administrative Procedure Act specifically provides that an
administrative finding is not to be set aside if it is supported by
"substantial evidence." 53 The courts are required to sustain an administrative finding that is supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole,5 4 and evidence may be reliable, probative, and
substantial even though it would not be admissible under the rules
of evidence followed in court proceedings.5 5 The differences in
origin and function between administrative agencies and courts "preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and
review which have evolved from the history and experience of
courts."56 Also it has been observed that even in judicial trials "the
whole tendency is to leave rulings as to the illuminating relevance
of testimony largely to the discretion of the trial court that hears
the evidence," and appellate courts "are less and less inclined to
base error on such rulings,"'57 and administrative tribunals "are given
even freer scope in the application of the conventional rules of evidence." 5 8 One of the purposes for establishing an administrative
agency is to permit "a more elastic and informal procedure than is
possible before our more formal courts." 59
A proceeding before a Review Committee, relative to the acreage
allotment or marketing quota for a farm, has in this respect unusual
52. 60 STAT. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1006(c).
53. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1009(e).

54. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474, 476-491 (1951);
O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 508 (1951); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 343 U.S. 373, 382 (1952).
55. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44 (1904) ; Tagg
Bros. v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 440-442 (1930); Opp Cotton Mills v.
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941); Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 705-706 (1948); Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676,
690-691 (9th Cir. 1949), certioraridenied, 338 U.S. 860; Concrete Materials
Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 189 F. 2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Phelps
Dodge Refining Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 139 F. 2d 393, 397 (2nd Cir.
1943); National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d
862, 873 (2nd Cir. 1938); Davis, ADMINISTRATivE LAw §§ 144 and 145 (1951
ed.. Federal Comm'n v. Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940).
57. Labor Board v. Donnelly Co., 330 U.S. 219, 236 (1947). It has been
declared that "[w]hile courts, in the administration of the law of evidence,
should be careful not to open the door to falsehood, they should be equally careful not to shut out truth." Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. (U.S.) 114, 141
(1865). A Price-Current pamphlet, a type of market news publication as to
prices, available and used in the ordinary course of business is not liable to
the objection that it is hearsay, and the publication is admissible in evidence in
a jury trial in court. Id. at 140-141.
58. Labor Board v. Donnelly Co., 330 U.S. 219, 236 (1947).
59. Lambros v. Young, 145 F. 2d 341, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
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features. The tribunal is a committee of farmers in lieu of a Hear60
ing Examiner under § 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act.

In § 7(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act it is provided that
"nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of
specified classes of proceedings in whole or in part by or before
boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated pur-

suant to statute." 61 Although a Review Committee of farmers is a
tribunal that is "expert" in the subject matter within its jurisdiction,
it has been said that a requirement for adherence to formal or tech-

nical rules of procedure would manifestly present greater difficulties
in
for a Review Committee than ordinarily would be experienced
62
It
other types of proceedings before administrative agencies.
would seem that the effectiveness of this statutory plan, for hearings

before a Review Committee, is dependent on elastic and informal
procedure, and that the prefatory findings of the Committee, in support of their ultimate finding, need not be set forth in elaborate
detail.

The Marketing Quota Review Regulations sS state the method to
be followed in obtaining a hearing before a Review Committee, and
the general procedure to be followed at such hearing. The regula-

tions were published in the Federal Register, 64 and also appear in
the Code of Federal Regulations. 65

Inasmuch as the regulations

were issued in pursuance of constitutional statutory authority,66 the
regulations have the same force and effect as if prescribed in terms
60. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1010.
61. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1006(a).

The legislative history of this statutory
provision emphasizes that it relates to, and thereby excludes, quota allotment
proceedings under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Sen. Doc. No.
248, 79th Corig., 2d Sess., pp. 227 and 307 (1946).
62. Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies
(Proceedings of an Institute Conducted by the New York University School
of Law on February 1-8, 1947) pp. 372-373.
63. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.1 et seq. (1949 ed.) and 7 Code Fed. Regs.
8 711.29 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
64. Documents of general applicability and legal effect, issued by governmental agencies, are published in the Federal Register. 49 STAT'. 500, 501
(1935), 44 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 305. See, also, 1 Code Fed. Regs. H8 1.31-1.35
(1949 ed.). Judicial notice is taken of the contents of the Federal Register.
44 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 307. The publication of a document in the Federal Register creates a rebuttable presumption that it was duly issued, prescribed, and
promulgated, and that the copy of the document in the Federal Register is a
true copy of the original. Ibid.
65. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.1 et seq. (1949 ed.) and 7 Code Fed. Regs.
§ 711.29 (Cum. Supp. 1953). The documents in the Code of Federal Regulations are "prima facie evidence of the text of such documents and of the fact
that they are in full force and effect on and after the date of publication thereof." 44 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 311(c).
66. The provisions of the Act are constitutional. Wickard v. Filbur, 317
U.S. 111, 118-133 (1942); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47-51 (1939);
Troppy v. La Sara Farmers Gin Co., 113 F. 2d 350, 351-352 (5th Cir. 1940)'.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1954

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1954], Art. 2
SOUT7H CARoLINA LAW QUARTIRLY
[Vol. 6
67
by the statute, i. e., the regulations have the force and effect of law.
The regulations require the County Committee to notify each farmer in the County as to the establishment of the allotment for his
farm. 68 An application for review before the Review Committee may
be filed in writing, with the secretary of the County Committee,
"within fifteen days after the date of mailing of the notice" of the
allotment by the County Committee.6 9 The application for review
should contain, inter alia, a brief statement of each ground on which
the application is based, and a statement of the allotment or quota
for which claim is made. 70 The place of the hearing shall be in the
office of the County Committee through which the allotment or quota
sought to be reviewed was originally established, unless the Review
Committee, on due notice, designates some other "place" in the
County.71 Due notice shall be given as to the time and place of the
hearing. 72 The Review Committee may continue the hearing from
day to day or adjourn the hearing to a different place in the County
or to a later date.73
"The hearing shall be open to the public and shall be conducted
in a fair and impartial manner" and so as to afford all interested persons "reasonable opportunity" to give and produce evidence relevant
to the determination of the allotment or quota for the applicant.74
The County Committee is required to submit an answer, and if it is
not submitted in time to afford the applicant for review, i. e., the appellant, adequate opportunity to prepare and present his case, the
Review Committee shall continue the hearing for such period of
time as will afford the applicant reasonable opportunity to prepare
for the hearing. 75

67. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-385 (1947);
Lilly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 488 (1943); Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937).
68. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.5 (1949 ed.). The statute contains the same
requirement. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1362.
69. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.7 (1949 ed.). Also, see, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed.
§ 1363.
70. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.8 (1949 ed.).
71. 7 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 711.22, 711.23, and 711.24 (1949 ed.). The term
"quota," as defined in the regulations, means a marketing quota, under the terms
of the Act, and also, for the purposes of review, includes the acreage allotment, normal yield, or actual yield established or determined for the farm.
7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.1(g) (1949 ed.).
72. 7 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 711.23 and 711.24 (1949 ed.).
73. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.24. The statute requires a hearing, but does
not specify the place. This method of designating the "place!' of the hearing
permits the convenience of the parties to be considered, and is consonant with
a long established orinciole. See, e. g., 42 STAT. 998, 1002 (1922), as amended,
7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 9; 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1004(a); 28 U.S.C. Supp. V § 48;
and § 3 of the Act of September 24, 1789, 1 STAT. 73.
74. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.25(a) (1949 ed.).
75. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.25(d) (1949 ed.).
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The burden of proof at the hearing is on the applicant, i. e., the
appellant, as to all issues of fact raised by him. 7 6 Each witness
shall testify under oath, and oral and documentary evidence may be
submitted, and witnesses may be cross-examined for a full and true
disclosure of the facts.77 A transcript of the hearing shall be made,
and under the conditions set forth in the rules the testimony shall
be reported verbatim. 78 Written arguments and proposed findings
of fact may be submitted for consideration by the Review Committee. 79 The hearing may, under the circumstances set forth in the
regulations, be reopened for the purpose of taking additional evidence.8 0
As soon as practicable after the hearing has been completed, the
Review Committee shall file in writing its findings and determination
as to the proper allotment or quota.8 1 A certified copy of the findings and determination by the Review Committee shall be served
upon the applicant by depositing the document in the United States
mails, registered and addressed to the applicant at his last known
address, and also copies shall be forwarded to the County Committee
and to the State Committee. 82
In the event judicial review is sought, the Review Committee shall
certify and file in Court a transcript of the record upon which the
determination of the Committee was made, together with the findings
of fact and conclusion by the Committee.8 3 The suit for judicial review must be instituted within fifteen days after the notice of the
Review Committee's determination is mailed to the applicant. 84 Bond
shall be given in an amount and with surety satisfactory to the Court
to secure the United States for the costs of the proceeding.8 5 The
complaint in the proceeding on judicial review shall be served on
the Review Committee.8 6
If judicial review is sought in a "court of record of the State
having general jurisdiction, sitting in the county or the district in
which his [the plaintiff's] farm is located" 8 7 -instead
of the United
76. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.25(e) (1949 ed.); Lee v. DeBerry, 219 S.C.
382, 393, 65 S.E. 2d 775, 780 (1951) ; Rymer v. Garnett, 244 S.W. 2d 439, 440
(Ky. 1951).
77. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.25(e) (1949 ed.).
78. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.25(f) (1949 ed.).
79. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.25 (g) (1949 ed.).
80. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.29 (1949 ed.).
81. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.30(b) (1949 ed.).
82. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.31 (1949 ed.).
83. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.33 (a) (1949 ed.). The statute contains the same
requirement. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1365.
84. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §1365 and 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 711.33 (1949 ed.).
85. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1365.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
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States District Court in which judicial review may be obtained in the
alternative- nonetheless "[t]he Federal law governs in the interpretation of Federal statutes, even though the case is in a state
court."8 8 An Act of Congress should operate uniformly throughout
the country so that the general program will remain unimpaired.8 9
On judicial review of administrative action, only prejudicial error
is reversible error.9 0 Also, orderly procedure and good administration require that objections to the proceedings at an administrative
hearing should be made while the agency has an opportunity for
correction, and the general rule is that a failure to make an objection
before the agency precludes judicial review of the issue.91 "A reviewing court usurps the agency's function when it sets aside the
administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented
and deprives the Commission of an opportunity to consider the mat92
ter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action."
It is provided in the Act that on judicial review application may
be made to the Court for leave to adduce additional evidence, "and if
it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure
to adduce such evidence before the review committee, the Court may
direct such additional evidence to be taken before the review committee in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the
Court may seem proper," and the committee may modify its findings
or determination by reason of the additional evidence so taken and
then file with the Court the modified findings or determination. 93
In Southport Co. v. Labor Board,9 4 it was held, under statutory
language similar to the provisions in the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938, that "the application for leave to adduce additionalevidence . . . was addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the
court" and before granting relief the Court "must be satisfied of the
materiality of the additional evidence, and that there were reasonable
88. Lee v. DeBerry, 219 S.C. 382, 388, 65 S.E. 2d 775, 778 (1951).
89. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209 (1946);
Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 320 U.S. 508, 510-511 (1944);
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942).

90. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1009(e); Union Starch and Refining Co. v. National

Labor Rel. Bd., 186 F. 2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir. 1951), certiorari denied, 342
U.S.815 (1951).
91. United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952); Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946); United States v.
Northern Pacific Ry., 288 U.S. 490, 494 (1933); Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927); Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 253
U.S.117, 130-131 (1920).
92. Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946).
93. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1366.

94. 315 U.S. 100, 104 (1942).
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grounds for failure to adduce it at the hearing" before the administrative agency.95 That decision is consonant with the general principle that one who seeks a new hearing on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence should show not only that the evidence on which
he relies, as the basis of his claim for a new or reopened hearing,
was in fact newly discovered or unknown to him until after the hearing was completed, but also that he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at the hearing,
i.e., that his failure to produce the newly discovered evidence was
not due to any neglect or want of diligence on his part.96 Newly
discovered evidence which would not materilly change the result is
not ground for a new hearing. 97 The application for a new or reopened hearing should not only aver the exercise of due diligence
or employ an equivalent expression in support of the application,
but the exercise of due diligence should be manifest from the facts
or details related or set forth in support of the application. 98
The statutory method for reviewing the validity of an allotment
or quota is "exclusive." 99 It is the purpose of the Act to forbid any
method of judicial review of the administrative findings other than
by a direct proceeding against the Review Committee, thereby precluding an indirect method of securing such review by means of an
injunction action against enforcement officers such as was resorted
to under another statute in Shields v. Utah Idaho R. Co., 10 0 or
through the method of an action against the Government under the
so-called Tucker Act,1 0 ' or by a declaratory judgment proceeding.102
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution is applicable with respect to the establishment of marketing
quotas, and the statutory plan in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 does not impinge on the requirements of due process.' 03 But
on judicial review of a quota for a farm any issue as to due pro95. Ibid.
96. United States v. Bransen, 142 F. 2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1944).
97. Ibid.
98. Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F. 2d 708, 712 (7th Cir.
1941); National Labor Rel. Board v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 152 F. 2d 198,
201 (6th Cir. 1945), certiorari denied, 328 U.S. 866 (1946); National Labor
Rel. Bd. v. May Department Stores, 154 F. 2d 533, 540 (8th Cir. 1946), certioraridenied, 329 U.S. 725 (1946).
99. Lee v. Roseberry, 94 F. Supp. 324, 327-328 (3-judge Court, E.D. Ky.
1950); Larkin v. Roseberry, 54 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. Ky. 1944); Lee v.
Roseberry, 200 F. 2d 155, 155-156 (6th Cir. 1952).
100. 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
101. 28 U.S.C. Supp. V § 1346.
102. Lee v. Roseberry, 94 F. Supp. 324, 327-328 (3-judge Court, E.D. Ky.
1950); Larkin v. Roseberry, 54 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. Ky. 1944); Lee v.
Roseberry, 200 F. 2d 155, 155-156 (6th Cir. 1952).
103. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129-133 (1942).
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cess, in connection with the determination of the quota, may as a
general rule be presented. The fact, however, that a particular quota
"may demonstrably be disadvantageous" to a certain area or person
104
is not enough to constitute a violation of the due process clause.
The quota system "may impose hardships here and there" and "the
incidence of hardship may shift in location and intensity," but such
cannot be regarded as sufficient to constitute "discrimination of such
an injurious character as to bring into operation the due process
clause."'105 It has been "pointed out many times that the exercise
of the federal commerce power is not dependent on its maintenance of
the economic status quo; the Fifth Amendment is no protection against
a congressional scheme of business regulation otherwise valid, merely
because it disturbs the profitability or methods" of those business
concerns or persons affected. 106
A person who fails to show that he has suffered or is immediately in danger of suffering any legal injury, under the quota provisions
of the statute, lacks adequate standing to present an issue as to
constitutionality. 107 "For adjudication of constitutional issues, 'concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions' are requisite." 108 It is not sufficient for the appellant merely to show that
he "suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."

109

Penalties are prescribed by the Act relative to marketings in excess of the marketing quota for the farm.110 A primary purpose of
104. Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Co., 338 U.S. 604, 618 (1950),
involving marketing quotas under the Sugar Act of 1948, 61 STAT. 922 (1947),
7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1100 et seq.
105. Id. at 619.
106. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 322, n. 20
(1953).
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is inapplicable to
Federal legislation or regulation thereunder (Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,
318 (1879) ); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610 (1936) ), and also under the Fourteenth Amendment it has been held that there is a "wide range" for classification, in connection with regulation, and: "To be able to find fault with a
law is not to demonstrate its invalidity. It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet
be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical
ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations -illogical,
it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice
may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to
our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be
declared void under the Fourteenth Amendment .... ." Metropolis Theatre Co.
v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913). See also, Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co.
v. Cram, 228 U.S. 70, 81-85 (1913).
107. Lee v. Roseberry, 200 F. 2d 155, 156 (6th Cir. 1952). The principle
followed in Lee v. Roseberry, supra, is supported by the holding in Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
108. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947).
109. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
110. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1340, 1346, 1348, 1356, 1359, 1372.
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the Act is to limit national and individual farm marketings to the
quotas allotted. "The purpose of Congress in requiring payment of
penalties into the Federal Treasury for marketing above the allotted
amount was not to raise revenue for the Government's financial advantage but to deter farmers from planting and marketing more than
their quotas."' 1 ' "Although Congress neither wholly prohibited nor
made it a crime for a farmer to market cotton in excess of his quota,
still it imposed sanctions upon non-cooperators analogous to those of
the criminal law."' " 2 The penalties bear interest from the date of
judgment, but not for the period between the date the penalties
become due and the date of judgment." 3
It is only necessary that the Government prove its case by the preponderance of the evidence in a proceeding to recover penalties under
the Act, and a regulatory provision that the buyer should deduct
the penalty from the price and remit the amount of the penalty to the
Government does not relieve the producer from liability for the
penalty when it is not collected and remitted by the buyer. 114 The
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized by the statute to issue rules
or regulations with respect to the collection of penalties, and a regulation creating a presumption, under certain circumstances, that a
commodity has been marketed in excess of the quota is valid." 5
Statutory provisions require reports and records by processors,
warehousemen, and various other persons relative to the marketing
of commodities under marketing quotas," 6 and the Secretary or his
representatives may examine or inspect all such books, papers, and
other records. 1 ' 7 The Secretary is also authorized to provide for
measuring farms "for ascertaining whether the acreage planted for
any year ... is in excess of the farm acreage allotment . . . for the

farm

.

"118

This outline, in brief compass, of the statutory plan for acreage
allotments or marketing quotas does not, of course, mention numerous provisions in the Act and the regulations, particularly those provisions that are peculiar to a particular commodity subject to regulation.
111. Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 374 (1947).
112. Ibid.

113. Id. at 373-376.

114. Usher v. United States, 146 F. 2d 369, 371-372 (4th Cir. 1944).
115. Id. at 370-371.

116. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1373.
117. Rodgers v. United States, 138 F. 2d 992, 994-996 (6th Cir. 1943).
118. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1374.
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Ii.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937119 reenacted
with amendments many of the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,120 as amended, including the amendments in the
Act of August 24, 1935.121 The purpose of the statute1 22 is "to
establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities . . . as will establish, as the prices to farmers,

parity prices" as defined in the Act, and also protect the interest of
the consumers by a gradual correction of the current price level at
as rapid a rate as the Secretary of Agriculture deems to be in the
public interest and feasible in view of the current consumptive demand in domestic and foreign markets.12 3 With respect to milk,
the Secretary is authorized, whenever he finds that the parity price
is not reasonable in view of the price of feeds, the available supplies
of feeds, and other economic conditions which affect market supplies
and demand for milk and its products in the marketing area under
consideration, to fix such minimum prices, which dealers or handlers
shall pay to producers for their milk, as he finds will reflect such

119. 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 601 et seq.
120. 48 STAT. 31 (1933). Certain sections of this statute with respect to
processing taxes were held invalid in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 5378 (1936). The remaining provisions of the Act, as amended by the Act of
August 24, 1935, 49 STAT. 750, relative to marketing agreements and marketing
orders were separate and distinct from the sections that were invalidated in
the Butler case, and the statutory provisions for marketing agreements and
marketing orders continued in effect. United States v. David Buttrick Co., 91
F. 2d 66, 67-69 (1st Cir. 1937); Edwards v. United States, 91 F. 2d 767, 789
(9th Cir. 1937); Whittenburg v. United States, 100 F. 2d 520, 521 (5th Cir.
1939). The legislative history of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937 discloses that "these provisions [for marketing orders and marketing
agreements] are and were intended to be effective independently of the production adjustment provisions" invalidated in the Butler case. H. R. Rep. No. 468,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. These provisions for the regulation of marketing
were believed to be within the ambit of the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and by reenacting and further amending these
statutory provisions any question as to their separability, under the decision in
the Butler case, was obviated. Ibid. and Sen. Rep. No. 565, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937), pp. 2-3.
121. 49 STAT. 750 (1935).
122. The economic objective of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
has been modified in some respects by the Act of August 1, 1947, 61 STAT. 707,
and by the Act of July 3, 1948, 62 STAT.1257.
123. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 602. The statute also contains, in the declaration of
policy, some qualifications relative to maintaining prices to farmers above the
parity level, and declares the purpose to establish and maintain such minimum
standards of quality and maturity and such grading and inspection requirements
for certain agricultural commodities enumerated in the Act, other than milk
and its products, as will effectuate such orderly marketing of the agricultural
commodities as will be in the public interest.
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factors, insure a sufficient quantity of pure and wholesome milk, and
12 4
be in the public interest.
The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to enter into a marketing agreement after due notice and opportunity for hearing with
processors, producers, associations of producers, and others engaged
in the handling of any agricultural commodity or product thereof

if the Secretary finds that the marketing agreement will effectuate
the declared policy of the Act, and the statute provides that the
agreement, if entered into, is exempted from the Anti-Trust laws
of the United States.12 5 The Secretary is also authorized to issue
marketing orders relative to the marketing or handling of the commodities or products specified in the Act, and such marketing orders
are applicable to all processors, associations of producers, and others
engaged in the handling of the agricultural commodity or product
subject to the provisions of the order. 126 Orders may be applicable
"only to the following agricultural commodities and the products
thereof (except products of naval stores and the products of honeybees), or to any regional, or market classification of any such commodity or product: Milk, fruits (including filberts, almonds, pecans
and walnuts but not including apples, other than apples produced
in the States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, and not including
fruits, other than olives, for canning or freezing), tobacco, vegetables
(not including vegetables, other than asparagus, for canning or
freezing), soybeans, hops, honeybees and naval stores as included
in the Naval Stores Act and standards established thereunder (including refined or partially refined oleoresin) YY127
A marketing order may regulate such handling of the particular
commodity or product as "is in the current of interstate or foreign
commerce, or which directly burdens, obstructs, or affects interstate
124. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(18).

The price provided for in this section

of the Act "cannot be determined by mathematical formula but the standards
give ample indications of the various factors to be considered by the Secretary".
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939).
125. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608b.

In the absence of a marketing agreement

or marketing order there is no exemption, under this statute, from the Anti-

Trust laws (United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 197-198 (1939) ), and
the exemption applies only to actions in conformity to the marketing agreement
or marketing order (American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum
Co., 153 F. 2d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Maryland & Virginia
Milk Pro. Ass'n, 90 F. Supp. 681, 688 (D.C. 1950), reversed on other grounds,

193 F. 2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ). The Act is not invalid because it is in conflict with the Anti-Trust laws, but prevails over the earlier Anti-Trust laws.
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 127 F. 2d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 1942).

All of the programs in effect under this Act have been made effective by market-

ing orders, although in some instances a marketing agreement has been executed
in conjunction with a marketing order.

126. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(1).
127. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(2).
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or foreign commerce in such commodity or product thereof."12 8 The
statute is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to regulate
commerce, 129 and confers on the Secretary of Agriculture "the full
reach of the commerce power." 13 0 The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states,
but extends "to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce." 131 The power to regulate commerce,
under this statute, includes (1) the power to fix quotas and otherwise
limit the shipments of fresh fruits, vegetables, and the specialty
crops enumerated in the statute, 132 and (2) the power to fix the
minimum prices which dealers or handlers shall pay to producers
for their milk. 133 The power of a State to fix prices was upheld in
Nebbia v. New York,13 4 and the authority of the Federal Government
over interstate commerce does not differ in extent or character from
that of the states relative to intrastate commerce.1 35 A sale by a
producer to a dealer or handler is a part of the flow of commerce, 136
and the use of an equalization pool or producer-settlement fund, as
provided for in milk orders, is reasonably adapted to allow regulation of the marketing of milk and is not violative of due process.1 37
Adequate standards are set forth in the Act to guide the Secretary
128. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(1). Also see the definition of "interstate or
foreign commerce" in 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 610(j).
129. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 568-578 (1939);
Whittenburg v. United States, 100 F. 2d 520, 521-523 (5th Cir. 1939) ; Wallace
v. Hudson-Duncan & Co., 98 F. 2d 985, 989-994 (9th Cir. 1938); Edwards v.
United States, 91 F. 2d 767, 778-789 (9th Cir. 1937).
130. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 123 (1942).
131. Id. at 119.
132. Whittenburg v. United States, 100 F. 2d 520, 521-523 (5th Cir. 1939);
Wallace v. Hudson-Duncan & Co., 98 F. 2d 985, 989-994 (9th Cir. 1938);
Edwards v. United States, 91 F. 2d 767, 778-789 (9th Cir. 1937). "The Constitution does not forbid State or nation to legislate for the public good on
economic lines.

If the economic end is to be reached by an interstate regula-

tion of commerce, the Congress may and must devise the regulation." Whittenburg v. United States, 100 F. 2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1939). The use of marketing quotas, apportioned to different geographic areas and administratively allocated to individual shippers, is a device used under various regulatory statutes.

See, e. 9., Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Co., 338 U.S. 604, 617

(1950), relative to marketing quotas for sugar; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.

111, 118-133 (1942), relative to marketing quotas for wheat; and Mulford v.
Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 41-49 (1939), relative to marketing quotas for tobacco.
133. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 568-573 (1939).

134.
135.
136.
137.

291 U.S. 502, 521-539 (1934).
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 568-573 (1939).
Id. at 568-569.
Id. at 572-573.
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of Agriculture in the regulative process, and there is no illegal delegation of authority.1 38
Although the statute vests in the Secretary the full reach of the
commerce clause and the Secretary may exert his authority to the
ultimate, 18 9 nonetheless the Secretary of Agriculture may regulate
not at all or he may provide for limited regulation. Also the statute
provides that the Secretary is directed to confer with and hold joint
hearings with the duly constituted authorities of any State, and the
Secretary is authorized to cooperate with such authorities and to issue
orders "complementary to orders or other regulations issued by such
authorities ..
".."140
The Act "contemplates the existence of state
programs at least until such time as the Secretary shall establish a
federal marketing program, unless the state program in some way
conflicts with the policy of the federal Act".1 41 The adoption of an
adequate program by the State may be deemed by the Secretary a
sufficient ground for believing that the policy of the Act of Congress
may be effectuated without the promulgation of a program by the
Secretary.- 42 In the event of regulation by a State and, also, regulation under the Act of Congress, an effort should be made to maintain
uniformity in the formulation, administration, and enforcement of
the Federal and State programs.' 48 Some of the regulatory programs under this Act are in conjunction with State programs. 144 In
the Federal Register of October 10, 1953, there appears the decision
138. Id. at 574-578, and Whittenburg v. United States, 100 F. 2d 520, 521-523
(5th Cir. 1939) ; Wallace v. Hudson-Duncan & Co., 98 F. 2d 985, 994 (9th Cir.
1938) ; Edwards v. United States, 91 F. 2d 767, 785-789 (9th Cir. 1937).
139. See, e. g., Titusville Dairy Products Co. v. Brannan, 176 F. 2d 332,
334-336 (3rd Cir. 1949), certiorari denied, 338 U. S. 905 (1949); Beatrice
Creamery Co. v. Anderson, 75 F. Supp. 363, 365-367 (D.C. Kan. 1947);
Balazs v. Brannan, 87 F. Supp. 119, 120-121 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
140. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 610(i), Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352-359
(1943).
141. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 354 (1943).
142. Ibid.
143. It has been said that Congress was not enlarging the jurisdiction of the
States "by authorizing them to regulate subjects which would have otherwise
fallen within the exclusive Federal domain," but that Congress had in mind
State programs which would parallel Federal orders. Brief for the United
States as amicus curiae, p. 46, in Parker v. Brown, No. 46, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, October Term, 1942 (317 U.S. 341).
144. Several states provide for regulatory programs similar, in various respects, to those authorized by Congress for use in the marketing orders effective
under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. See, e. g., ALA.
Conz tit. 22, § 205-231 (1940) ; CALIT. AGm. Cong ANN. § 736 et seq. (Deering's
1951) ; 1935 CoLo. STAT. ANN. ch. 106, § 46 et seq. (1949); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 3112 et seq. (1949) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501. 13 et seq. (1943); GA. Cong
ANN. § 42.551 et seq. (1951) ; N. Y. AGR. AND M.ARcETs LAw § 252 et seq.
(McKinney's 1938, 1953 Supp.) ; P N . STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-102 et seq.
(Purdon's 1953); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 5, ch. 3, § 1 et seq. (1953) ; VA. CoDg
ANN. tit. 3, § 359 (1950).
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of the Secretary of Agriculture whereby approval is given, under the
Act, to certain amendments to the milk marketing order for the New

York metropolitan area, and the Secretary's decision states, inter
alia:

The regulatory program for the New York metropolitan marketing area is a joint Federal-State program. The Federal
order and the State order are complementary, and both orders
contain, in all material respects, identical provisions. In the
case of the original promulgation of the orders [in 1938], and
each amendment to the orders, joint hearings have been held
and the amendments to both orders have been identical in all
material respects. This program has been administered in accordance with the principles of procedure set forth in the
agreement or memorandum of understanding executed on August 26, 1938, by the Secretary of Agriculture of the United
States and the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of the
45
State of New York.1
There are 24 marketing orders in effect relative to fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops. 146 These programs relate, e. g., to pecans
grown in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi;
oranges, grapefruit, and tangerines grown in Florida; fresh Bartlett
pears, plums, and Elberta peaches grown in California; lemons grown
in California and Arizona; type 62 shade-grown cigar-leaf tobacco
grown in a specified area in Florida and Georgia; and walnuts grown
in California, Oregon, and Washington. The marketing orders for
fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops may, under the terms of the
statute, provide inter alia for the regulation of shipments by grade,
size, or volume, and for the allotment of quotas among handlers or
producers, and for establishing a reserve or surplus pool.' 47 The establishment of a reserve or surplus pool, portions of which may from
time to time be released for marketing, and the equitable distribution
of the proceeds of the pool among the persons beneficially interested
in the pool, are regulatory provisions within the authority conferred
on the Secretary by the terms of the statute. 14 8 Marketing quotas,
145. 18 Fed. Reg. 6458 (1953).
146. 7 Code Fed. Regs. Part 900 (Rev. 1952).
147. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(6). Also the orders may prohibit unfair me-

thods of competition and unfair trade practices in the marketing or handling
of the commodities or products subject to regulation, and may contain other
provisions auxiliary to those specifically authorized by the Act. 7 U.S.C. 1952
ed. § 608c(7).
148. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(6), and Wallace v. Hudson-Duncan & Co.,
98 F. 2d 985, 987-994 (9th Cir. 1938).
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under a uniform rule based upon the amounts which each handler
149
has available for current shipment, are valid under the Act.
These regulatory programs contemplate, in some instances, the issuance of volume, grade, or size regulations by the Secretary at
weekly or biweekly intervals during the marketing season, and for
the regulations to become effective promptly after issuance thereof
in order to effectuate the economic goal set forth in the Act.
The marketing orders which provide for regulation by grade, size,
maturity, or quality provide that each shipment of the commodity
or product subject to regulation must be inspected prior to shipment
by the Federal-State Inspection Service, and the certificate of inspection must be submitted to the administrative agency. 15 0 An
inspection certificate is admissible in evidence, as a record made in
the regular course of business, and in a proceeding in court a certificate of inspection is prima facie evidence of the truth of the state15 1
ments therein contained.
There are 50 marketing orders with respect to milk.152 These
programs relate to the marketing of milk in the metropolitan marketing areas of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Cleveland,
St. Louis, New Orleans, Seattle, Memphis, Knoxville, and numerous
other cities throughout the country. Marketing orders with respect
to milk provide for the classification of milk in accordance with its
use, and the orders fix or provide a method for fixing the minimum
prices which handlers shall pay for milk purchased from producers
or associations of producers, and such minimum prices shall be
uniform subject only to variations or adjustments authorized by the
statute.15 The marketing orders for milk provide for market-wide
pools or individual handler pools.' 5 4 Under a market-wide pool,
149. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(6) (C), and American Fruit Growers v. United

States, 105 F. 2d 722, 725-726 (9th Cir. 1939).

Also see Edwards v. United

States, 91 F. 2d 767, 775-776 (9th Cir. 1937). The statute sets forth numerous
details and alternative provisions which may be made the basis for different

types of regulation. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(6) (A), (B), (C), (D), (E),
(F), and (G).

150. See, e. g., the requirements in the marketing order regulating the han-

dling of pecans grown in Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and South
Carolina, 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 994.4(d) (Rev. 1952). "The purpose of the
order was to insure by prior inspection and certification that only pecans which
would meet certain grade requirements would reach the public consumers of
unshelled pecans outside the production area of Georgia, Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, and South Carolina." Hutches v. Renfroe, 200 F. 2d 337, 338 (5th
Cir. 1952).
151. Rennicke v. United States, 207 F. 2d 429, 432 (8th Cir. 1953).
152. 7 Code Fed. Regs. Part 900 (Rev. 1952).
153. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(5).

154. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) (B).
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the producers and associations of producers throughout the milkshed
receive a uniform price for all milk delivered to handlers, subject
only to the variations authorized in the statute, and under an individual handler pool the producers and associations of producers delivering
milk to the same handler receive a uniform price, for all milk thus
delivered by them, subject only to the variations provided for by the
Act.15 5
"The fluid milk industry is affected by factors of instability peculiar to itself which call for special methods of control,"' 56 and the
economy of the industry is "so eccentric that economic controls
have been found at once necessary and difficult". 157 The supply of
milk, available from producers, is subject to seasonal fluctuations
which, even under normal conditions, are substantial.' 58 The production of milk in the spring and summer months is much greater
than it is in the fall and winter months, and this surplus in the
spring and summer "must necessarily occur during those periods if
there are to be enough cows to furnish the requisite supply at
periods [of the year] when the milk yield is less".15 9 The surplus
milk cannot be satisfactorily stored for long periods of time, 160 and
the surplus milk- produced for the fluid milk market and, therefore, produced under the elaborate and expensive safeguards, as to
health requirements, for the fluid milk market- may find an outlet for use in milk products, but in that market the surplus milk is
in competition with milk produced originally for manufacturing which,
under health standards, is not required to meet the high requirements
of the fluid milk market.' 6 ' Milk produced for manufacturing has a
lower market price than milk disposed of on the fluid milk market.
"A satisfactory stabilization of prices for fluid milk requires that
the burden of surplus milk be shared equally by all producers and
all distributors in the mflkshed. So long as the surplus burden is
unequally distributed the pressure to market surplus milk in fluid
form will be a serious disturbing factor."'162
155. Ibid.
156. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 517 (1934).
157. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 529 (1949).
158. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 517-518 (1934); United

States v.
Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 548-550 (1939); Brannan v. Stark, 185 F.
2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affirmed, 342 U.S. 451 (1952).
159. Grandview Dairy v. Jones, 157 F. 2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1946), certiorari de-

nied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946).
160. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 517 (1934) ; United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 549-550 (1939).

161. Ibid.

162. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 517-518 (1934).

"It is generally

recognized that the chief cause of fluctuating pricei and supplies is the existence of a normal surplus which is necessary to furnish an adequate amount
for peak periods of consumption.

This results in an excess of production
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The immediate object of the Act is to fix minimum prices for
the milk sold by producers to dealers or handlers. 163 The statute
does not prescribe a rigid or inflexible method of fixing or computing prices. Marketing orders may contain "one or more" of the
methods set forth in the statute for classifying and pricing milk.164
Milk may be classified in accordance with the form in which or the
purpose for which it is used, and a marketing order may fix or provide a method for fixing minimum prices for each use classification. 165
A milk order may also provide for the payment to producers of a
uniform blended price, either under a market-wide pool or an individual handler pool. 1 66 The uniform blended price in a market-wide
pool is ascertained by dividing the total value of the milk of all
handlers in the marketing area, during a delivery period, by the
total quantity of such milk, and payment of the uniform blended
price is effected through what is called the producer-settlement or
equalization fund. 167 Each handler whose total value of milk at the
during the troughs of demand .... Since all milk produced cannot find a ready
market as fluid milk in flush periods, the surplus must move into cream, butter,
cheese, milk powder, and other more or less nonperishable products. Since
these manufactures are in competition with all similar dairy products, the prices
for the milk absorbed into manufacturing processes must necessarily meet the
competition of low-cost production areas far removed from the metropolitan
centers. The market for fluid milk for use as a fluid beverage is the most profitable to the producer. Consequently, all producers strive for the fluid milk
market . ... The approval of dairies by the Department of Health of New
York City, as a condition for the sale of their fluid milk in the metropolitan
area, isolates from this general competition a well recognized segment of the
entire industry. Since these producers are numerous enough to keep up a
volume of fluid milk for New York distribution beyond ordinary requirements,
cut-throat competition even among them would threaten the quality and in the
end the quantity of fluid milk deemed suitable for New York consumption. Students of the problem generally have apparently recognized a fair division among
producers of the fluid milk market and utilization of the rest of the available
supply in other dairy staples as an appropriate method of attack for its solution." United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 549-550 (1939).
This economic imbalance in the fluid milk industry is also discernible in metropolitan marketing areas in England and Canada. See, e. g., Ferrier v. Scottish
Milk Marketing Board [1937] A.C. 126, 131; and the Report of the Ontario
Royal Commission on Milk (by Honorable Dalton C. Wells, a Justice of the
Supreme Court of Ontario) p. 60.
163. The statute does not prohibit sales at prices above the minimum. Stark
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 291 (1944).
164. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(5). The statutory provisions for classifying,
pricing, and pooling milk "follow the methods employed by cooperative associations of producers prior to the enactment" of the legislation. Sen. Rep. No.
1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) p. 9. The "classification use plan" for
milk marketing, as set forth in the statute, has been "used in the industry
since 1916". Maryland & Virginia Milk Pro. Ass'n v. United States, 193 F.
2d 907, 915-916 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
165. The statute prohibits three types of provisions in milk orders. 7 U.S.C.
1952 ed. §§ 608c(5)(G), 608c(10), and 6 08c(13) (B).
166. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(5) (B).
167. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 571 (1939) ; Grandview Dairy v. Jones, 157 F. 2d 5, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1946), certiorari denied, 329
U.S. 787 (1946):

Published by Scholar Commons, 1954

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1954], Art. 2
VY 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTZR
[Vol.
class prices, for a particular delivery period, is greater than his total
payments to producers at the uniform blended price is required to
pay the difference to the producer-settlement fund, and each handler
whose total value of milk is less than his total payments to producers
at the uniform blended price is entitled to withdraw the amount of
such difference from the producer-settlement fund. "In order to
equalize the prices received by producers," under an order for a
market-wide pool, "handlers are required to clear their purchases
through the producer-settlement fund. Payments into and withdrawals from this fund depend upon the 'value' of the milk received
which is fixed by the order at different prices governed by the use
made by the handler of the purchased milk and upon whether his
obligations to producers are greater or less than the uniform price
due the producers under the scheme. The result of the use of the
device of an equalization pool is that each producer, dealing with a
proprietary handler, gets a uniform or weighted average price for
his milk, with differentials for quality, location, or other usual market
variations, irrespective of the manner of its use."1 68
In view of the different situations in the various milk marketing
areas, there has been a wide variation in the methods used in milk
orders in fixing the class or use prices. Generally, the orders have
provided "methods for fixing" the class prices. A simple method
has been used whereby a differential is added to the prices paid for
milk used to produce manufactured milk products, such as butter,
cheese, powder, or evaporated milk. Some orders set forth formulaic
provisions, based upon various economic factors, and these formulae
govern the preciation or determination of price for a use classification.16 9
The field of milk marketing has been characterized as "exquisitely
complicated"' 7 0 and the milk marketing orders for large metropolitan
areas regulate the marketing of large volumes of milk produced by
many thousands of producers. The milk supply "for the New York
metropolitan marketing area . . . is produced by approximately
50,000 dairy producers located throughout a production area which
includes portions of six states, and this milkshed extends more than
168. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 571 (1939).
169. See, e. g., 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 927.40 et seq. (Rev. 1952), 7 Code Fed.
Regs. § 904.40 ct seq. (Rev. 1952).
170. Queensboro Farms Products v. Wickard, 137 F. 2d 969, 974 (2d Cir.
1943.). "The milk problem is so vast that fully to comprehend it would require
an almost universal knowledge ranging from geology, biology, chemistry and

medicine to the niceties of the legislative, judicial, and administrative processes
of government." Id. at 975.
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400 miles from the marketing area".1 71 The total value of the milk
pooled and priced under the New York order in 1951 was $310,292,982.172

The regulatory terms of the statute and also the provisions in the
milk marketing orders have been the subject of considerable litigation with respect to the meaning of the various requirements. 173
It is presumed that Congress used words in a statute in their usual
and ordinary meaning, unless there is evidence to the contrary,174
and the recognized practices of an industry give meaning to the
17.
5
words of a statute dealing with it.
But few words have the precision of mathematical symbols, and "the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity"
with which legislators can spell out details in a statute.176 The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in determining the meaning
of statutory terms, 177 and that meaning is ascertained not only by
a consideration of the words of the Act but by considering also the
context, the purposes of the statute, and the circumstances under
171. 18 Fed. Reg. 6459 (1953). The dairy industry "is immense in scope"
and is a major branch of agriculture in this country. Queensboro Farms Products v. Wickard, 137 F. 2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1943).
172. 18 Fed. Reg. 6463 (1053).
173. See, e. g., Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952); Crowley's Milk Co.
v. Brannan, 198 F. 2d 861 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Kass v. Brannan, 196 F. 2d 791 (2d
Cir. 1952), certiorari denied, 344 U.S. 891 (1952); Titusville Dairy Products
Co. v. Brannan, 176 F. 2d 332 (3rd Cir. 1949), certioraridenied, 338 U.S. 905
(1949); Dairymen's League Cooperative Ass'n v. Brannan, 173 F. 2d 57 (2d
Cir. 1949), certioraridenied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949); Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v.
Anderson, 157 F. 2d 87 (8th Cir. 1946), certioraridenied, 329 U.S. 788 (1946).
174. Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. $24, 531 (1947); United States v.
Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 63 (1940); Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284
U.S. 552, 560 (1932) ; Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 250 (1924). "[T]he
plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to
any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard
case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would
discover." Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 294 F. 190, 194 (8th Cir. 1923),
affirmed, 267 U.S. 364 (1925), and the foregoing was quoted with approval in
the opinion of the Supreme Court, 267 U.S. at 370.
175. United States v. Maher, 307 U.S. 148, 155 (1939). See also Great
Northern Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 273 (1942).
176. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) ; Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 185-186 (1941); Tobin v. Edward
S. Wagner Co., 187 F. 2d 977, 979 (2d Cir. 1951). See, also Towne v. Eisner,
245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). "Lord Westbury declared long ago that 'there is not
a more fruitful source of error in law than the inaccuracy of language'." Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 29, 96 S.E. 407, 414 (1918).
177. United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 112-113 (1948). It has been held
that "[t]here is no surer guide in the interpretation of a statute than its purpose when that is sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark of over solicitude
for the letter than to wince at carrying out that purpose because the words
used do not formally quite match with it." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Tremaine, 133 F. 2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1943).
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which the words were used.' 78 A contemporaneous and settled administrative interpretation, as to the meaning of a statutory term,
is of great weight and should not be overturned unless the interpretation is clearly wrong or unless a different construction is plainly required. 179 Also, the administrative interpretation of a regulatory
order, issued by the administrative agency, is entitled to great weight,
and is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.' 8 0
The pricing of milk is affected by circumstances of great variety
and constant change. 181 Price fixing under a milk order, for a large
metropolitan marketing area, is not static but requires constant at82
tention and frequent hearings on proposed amendments.'
178. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258 (1937); Labor Board v.

Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 114, 124 (1944); Detroit Edison Co. v. Se-

curities & Exchange Commission, 119 F. 2d 730, 738 (6th Cir. 1941), certiorari
denied, 314 U. S. 618 (1941).
179. United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 193 (1930); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns., 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940); Boutell v. Walling, 327
U.S. 463, 470-471 (1946); Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947).
180. Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-414 (1945); Federal
Comm'n v. Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 n. 6 (1940); United Truck
Lines v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 189 F. 2d 816, 817 (9th Cir. 1951) ;
Armstrong Co. v. Walling, 161 F. 2d 515, 517 (1st Cir. 1947) ; Superior Packing Co. v. Porter, 156 F. 2d 193, 195 (8th Cir. 1946), certioraridenied, 329 U.S.
788 (1946); Bowles v. Mannie & Co., 155 F. 2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1946),
certioraridenied, 329 U.S. 736 (1946); Bowles v. Cudahy Packing Company,
154 F. 2d 891, 892 (3rd Cir. 1946). An administrative interpretation is controlling, on judicial review, even though it is not the only possible or reasonable interpretation. L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli, 169 F. 2d 60, 61
(1st Cir. 1948), certioraridenied, 335 U.S. 885 (1948). Administrative interpretations that lack uniformity and consistency are generally of little weight.
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 889-891 (3-judge Court,
S.D. N. Y. 1951), affirmed sub nor., Federal Maritime Board v. United States,
342 U.S. 950 (1952). Also see. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
144, 156 (1944); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Service Trucking Company, Inc., 186 F. 2d 400,
402 (3rd Cir. 1951). A tentative or preliminary interpretation is not binding
on a governmental agency. Dairymen's League Cooperative Ass'n v. Brannan,
173 F. 2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1949), certioraridenied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949).
An
unauthorized interpretation by a subordinate is not binding on a governmental
agency. Queensboro Farms Products v. Wickard, 137 F. 2d 969, 982 (2d
Cir. 1943). The United States is not bound or estopped by the unauthorized
acts of its officers or agents, and those dealing with an officer or agent of the
United States must be held to have had notice of the limitations upon his authority. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 382-386
(1947); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70 (1940); Wilber National
Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120, 123-124 (1935) ; Nichols & Company v.
Secretary of Agriculture, 131 F. 2d 651, 659 (lst Cir. 1942); United States v.
Globe Indemnity Company, 94 F. 2d 576, 578 (2d Cir. 1938); Smith v. Federal
Crop Ins. Corp., 214 Miss. 55, 61-63, 58 So. 2d 95, 97-98 (1952).
181. It has been said that the regulation of milk marketing is "an undertaking of monstrous difficulty". Dairymen's League Cooperative Ass'n v. Brannan, 173 F. 2d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 1949), certioraridenied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949).
182. More than 200 changes were made in the regulatory provisions of the
New York milk marketing order during the period from September 1938 through
December 1949, and the changes were on 53 different occasions. 18 Fed. Reg.
6459 (1953).
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The statutory provisions for hearings on milk orders or amendments to milk orders are the same as for the regulatory programs
applicable to fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops. The Secretary
of Agriculture shall hold a public hearing whenever he has "reason
to believe" that the issuance of a marketing order, with respect
to a particular commodity or product, will tend to effectuate the
declared policy of the Act.' 83 The provisions in the statute for a
hearing on a marketing order and for the subsequent issuance of an
order, if the requisite findings are made, apply likewise to a hearing
on an amendment to an order and the subsequent issuance of the
84
amendment.'
The public hearings, under this statute, relative to marketing
orders or amendments thereto are governed by the terms of the
statute, the regulations thereunder, 8 5 and the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act.' 8 6 A marketing program or amendment thereto may be proposed by the Secretary of Agriculture or by
any other person, and the proposed program or amendment should
be filed, in writing, with the Department, in accordance with the
regulations. 87 If it is concluded that there is reason to believe that
the proposed regulation will tend to effectuate the declared policy of
the Act, the notice of hearing shall be issued, by the Department,
and published in the Federal Register.' 8 8 The regulations provide
that the notice of hearing with respect to a proposed order or amendment shall, inter alia, define the scope of the hearing as specifically
as may be practicable; shall contain either the terms or the substance
of the proposed regulation or a description of the subjects and issues
involved; shall state the industry, area, and class of persons to be
regulated; and shall state the time and place of the hearing, and the
place where copies of the proposed regulation may be obtained or
183. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(3).

184. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(17). The Act states that notice of a hearing
on a proposed amendment to a marketing order given at least three days prior
to the hearing shall be deemed "due notice thereof". Ibid.
185. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.1 et seq. (1949 ed.).
186. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1001 et seq.
187. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.3 (Rev. 1952).
188. 7 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 900.3 and 900.4 (Rev. 1952). "Whenever notice
of hearing or of opportunity to be heard is required or authorized to be given
by or under an Act of Congress, or may otherwise properly be given, the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons ... if said notice
shall be published in the Federal Register .

. . ."

44 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 308.

Actual notice is adequate, even though formal notice is not given, inasmuch as a
person is not prejudiced, in that situation, by a failure to give formal notice.
W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 506, 509 (W.D.
Penn. 1951). See also, Pinkett v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 67, 71-72 (3judge Court, D. Md. 1952).
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examined.18 9 The notice of hearing is adequate if it discloses "the
general considerations" and issues. 190 A hearing of this type relates
to "rule making" under the Administrative Procedure Act,191 and is
oftentimes referred to as a promulgation hearing.' 92 An apt description of a hearing relative to the issuance of a marketing order or an
amendment thereto is as follows in United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Company,193 a case under the Chicago milk marketing order:
The object of such a hearing is not only to afford the individuals the opportunity of airing their objections to the proposed scheme of things, but is also to give the administrators
the chance of obtaining information which might have been
overlooked or otherwise not available to them.
The realities of the situation are clear. In the case of many
proposed . . . [programs or amendments], hundreds of people
may be present at a hearing and every individual would be
equally desirous of insuring the maximum protection to his own
interests. If the equivalent of court proceedings were granted
to each person, or even to groups, the hearing would be unwieldly and not susceptible to a satisfactory conclusion. Obviously, a more workable balance must be struck between administrative efficiency and the protection of individual rights.
A Hearing Examiner appointed under the Administrative Procedure Act shall serve as the presiding officer at the hearing. 19 4 All
interested persons shall be given an opportunity to be heard with
respect to matters that are relevant and material to the proceeding.
The testimony at the hearing shall be reported verbatim, shall be
under oath, and cross-examination shall be permitted to the extent
necessary for a full and true disclosure of the facts, 195 and documentary evidence may be received at the hearing.' 96 Subsequent
189. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.4 (Rev. 1952).
190. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Company, 127 F. 2d 907, 910 (7th
Cir. 1942). See also, Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676, 684-685
(9th Cir. 1949), certioraridenied, 338 U.S. 860.
191. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1001(c).
192. For a discussion of the difference betveen rule-making and adjudication, see Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) and In re

Federal Water & Gas Corp., 188 F. 2d 100, 104 (3rd Cir. 1951), certioraridenied mtb non., Chenery Corporation v. Securities & Exchange Com., 341 U.S.
953 (1951).
193. 127 F. 2d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 1942).
194. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1010.
195. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.8(d) (1) (Rev. 1952) and 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed.
§ 1006(c). Also see, Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 190 F. 2d 275, 277
(5th Cir. 1951).
196. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.8(d) (4)

(Rev. 1952) and 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed.

§ 1006(c).
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to the hearing, briefs and proposed findings and conclusions may be
filed with the Hearing Clerk within the period of time specified by
the Hearing Examiner. 197 A transcript of the hearing, as certified by
the Hearing Examiner, shall be kept on file in the Office of the
Hearing Clerk in the United States Department of Agriculture, and
198
shall be available for examination as a public record.
A recommended decision shall be prepared, subsequent to a hearing, and filed by the Department in accordance with the requirements
in the regulations,' 9 9 and the recommended decision shall include,
inter alia, an explanation of the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record of the hearing, and shall set forth
proposed findings and conclusions with respect to the issues as well
as the reasons or basis for the findings and conclusions, and shall
include a proposed marketing order if an order is warranted on
the basis of the hearing record.2 00 The recommended decision shall
be published in the Federal Register, and opportunity shall be given
to all interested persons to file exceptions thereto within the period
20
of time specified in the notice of the recommended decision. ' After
due consideration of the record, the Secretary shall render a final
decision, and the final decision shall include, inter ala, a statement
of his findings and conclusions as well as the reasons and basis
therefor with respect to all of the material issues of fact, law, or
°
a ruling upon each exception
discretion presented on the record,202
20 3
shall set forth the marketand
decision,
recommended
the
filed to
ing order-if the Secretary finds upon the record that the order
and all of its terms and provisions will tend to effectuate the declared
197.7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.9(b) (Rev. 1952).
198. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.11 (Rev. 1952).
199. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.12 (Rev. 1952). This requirement is also in
§ 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1007.
200. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.12(b) (Rev. 1952). One of the requirements
for the issuance of an order is a finding by the Secretary that, on the basis of
the evidence adduced at the hearing, the order and all the terms and provisions
thereof will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the Act. 7 U.S.C.
1952 ed. § 608c(4).
201. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.12(c) (Rev. 1952). The filing of the recommended decision may be omitted only if the Secretary finds on the basis of the
record that due and timely execution of his functions imperatively and unavoidably requires such omission. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.12(d) (Rev. 1952).
202. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1007. The findings need not be formal or in separately numbered paragraphs, and it is enough if the findings appear in the form
of a statement in the report or order of the administrative agency. Johnston
Seed Co. v. United States, 191 F. 2d 228, 230 (10th Cir. 1951); Norfolk

Southern Bus Corp. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 756, 759-760 (3-judge Court,

E.D. Va. 1950), affirmed, 340 U.S. 802 (1950) ; Beard-Laney v. United States,

83 F. Supp. 27, 31 (3-judge Court, E.D. S. C. 1949), affirmed, 338 U.S. 803

(1949).
203. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1007.
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policy of the Act 2° 4 - which shall be complete except for the effective date and the determinations relative to handler and producer
approval.20 5 The program may become effective only if the Secretary subsequently finds that it meets with the requisite industry
2 06
approval.
The Act provides that no order shall become effective, except as
hereinafter explained, unless the handlers of at least 50 per cent
of the volume of the particular commodity have signed a marketing
agreement with provisions similar to those in the order, and unless
the order is approved by two-thirds of the producers by number or
volume. 20 7 If the requisite approval by the handlers is not obtained,
the Secretary may nevertheless issue an order if he finds that the
issuance of an order is the only practical means of advancing the
interests of the producers pursuant to the declared policy of the
Act and if the issuance of the order meets with the requisite approval of the producers. 20 8 For the purpose of ascertaining whether
the issuance of an order is approved or favored by the producers,
the Secretary may conduct a referendum among the producers,
and the statutory requirements for the producer approval "shall be
held to be complied with if, of the total number of producers, or
the total volume of production, as the case may be, represented in
such referendum, the percentage approving or favoring is equal to
or in excess of the percentage required" under the provisions of the
Act.

20 9

204. The Act provides that the Secretary "shall issue an order if he finds,
and sets forth in such order, upon the evidence introduced at such hearing
...that the issuance of such order and all of the terms and conditions thereof"
will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the Act. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed.
§ 608c(4).
205. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.13a (Rev. 1952).
206. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.14 (Rev. 1952) and 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(8)
and (9).
207. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(8). Approval is required by three-fourths
of the producers of citrus fruits produced in any area producing what is
known as California citrus fruits. Ibid. The approval by number or by volume
relates to those producers who were engaged in that business during a representative period determined by the Secretary. Ibid.
208. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c (9), and § 102 of the 1947 Reorg. Plan No. 1
(12 Fed. Reg. 4534).
209. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(19). Only the producers who are affected
by an order are entitled to participate in the referendum. H. P. Hood & Sons
v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 597-599 (1939); United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 127 F. 2d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 1942). A finding as to producer approval is not invalid merely because it is not "in the exact words" of the
statute-the absence of such parrotry is not fatal. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra. "There is no authority in the courts to go behind this
conclusion of the Secretary [as to producer approval in the referendum] to
inquire into the influences which caused the producers to favor the resolution,"
j. e., the program. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 559
(1939).
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The statutory provisions with respect to approval by the specified
percentage of producers do not involve a delegation of legislative
authority. 210 Under similar provisions in another regulatory statute
it has been held that Congress "exercises its legislative authority
in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its
application," and the "required favorable vote upon the referendum
is one of these conditions".2 11 Congress could have provided for
the marketing order to become effective without a determination
as to approval by the producers, and the requirements, in this regard,
in the Act constitute merely a restriction or condition with respect
to regulation.
In a referendum relative to the issuance of a marketing order,
cooperative associations of producers may, under the terms of the
Act, "express the approval or disapproval for all of their members
or patrons".2 12 "This is not an unreasonable provision, as the
cooperative is the marketing agency for those for whom it votes....
interest in the
These associations of producers . . . have a vital
2 18
establishment of an efficient marketing system.
In the administration of the Act, the Secretary of Agriculture is
required to "accord such recognition and encouragement to producerowned and producer-controlled cooperative associations as will be
in harmony with the policy toward cooperative associations set forth
in existing Acts of Congress, and as will tend to promote efficient
methods of marketing and distribution".2 14 Different treatment and
special considerations have been accorded to cooperative associations
of producers by State and Congressional legislation alike, and the
"distinctions between such cooperatives and business organizations
have repeatedly been held to justify different treatment".2 1 5 Numerous Acts of Congress deal with cooperatives differently from proprietary business enterprises and enunciate the policy of aiding and encouraging the establishment, operation, and growth of marketing
cooperatives.2 16 The policy of Congress to put agriculture on a
basis of economic equality with other industries is to be accomplished,
in part at least, by encouraging the organizations of producers into
210. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 577-578 (1939).
211. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 16 (1939).

212. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 559 (1939).
213. Ibid.
214. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 610(b) (1).

215. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 563 (1939).

See also,

Hulbert, LEGAL PHASES osVCo-opaAnvz AssoCiATiONS (Farm Credit Administration, May 1942) pp. 307-322.

216. See, e. g., 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 10a, 291, 610(b) (1) ; 12 U.S.C. 1952 ed.

§§ 1141 and 1141j; 15 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 13b and 17.
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effective associations, under their own control, for greater unity of

effort in marketing.21 7 Also strong cooperative organizations are
2 18
generally necessary in the effective operation of a marketing order,
and it has been concluded that in one of the large marketing areas
"[a]ctive participation by producers [in the regulatory program]
*. . is feasible only by means of cooperative associations of produc2 19
ers".
In an order the Secretary shall select, or provide a method for
the selection of, an agency to administer the order, in accordance with
its terms and provisions, and the agency may be authorized to make
rules and regulations to effectuate the terms and provisions of the
order; to recommend to the Secretary amendments to the order; and
to receive, investigate, and report to the Secretary complaints as to
violations of the order. 220 A market administrator is selected, as
the agency, to administer a milk order, and a committee or board is
selected as the agency to administer a marketing order for fruits,
vegetables, or specialty crops. The statute permits broad discretion
to be exercised relative to the selection of an administrative agency
under a marketing order. The expenses of an administrative agency
thus established under a marketing order are defrayed by means of
2 21
collecting assessments from the handlers regulated by the order.
Each handler is required to pay to the administrative agency "such
handler's pro rata share (as approved by the Secretary) of such expenses as the Secretary may find" are reasonable and likely to be
2 22
incurred by the administrative agency during a particular period.
The exaction of assessments to cover administrative expenses is auxiliary to the regulation of commerce, and is a familiar statutory provision
217. 12 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1141(a). It has been said that: "More and more,
in its social engineering, the law is looking to cooperative effort by those within an industry as a force for social good. It is harnessing the power that is
latent within groups, as it is harnessing the power in wind and fall and stream.
Conspicuously is it doing this in its dealing with agricultural producers, spread
often over wide areas, and thus deficient in cohesion, but yielding up new energies when functioning together . . . . We see it in the co-operative marketing
associations ...
of recent years . . . , associations with privileges and powers

peculiar to themselves." People v. Teuscher, 248 N.Y. 454, 463, 162 N.E. 484,
487 (1928), opinion by Cardozo, J.
218. Report of the Associate Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, in Charge of the Division of Marketing and Marketing Agreements and the President of the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation
(19395, p. 30.
219. Decision by the Secretary of Agriculture relative to certain amendments
to the New York metropolitan milk marketing order, 18 Fed. Reg. 6458,
6460 (1953).
220. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(7) (C).
221. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 610(b) (2).
222. Ibid.
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under the commerce clause.2 23 An employee of an administrative
agency, under a marketing order, acts on behalf of the United States,
and may be subject to provisions in the Criminal Code relative to
persons who are officers of the United States or persons acting for
224
or on behalf of the United States in an official capacity.
All persons subject to the regulatory provisions of a program
under the Act may be required to maintain books and records and
submit such information as may be necessary to enable the administrative agency and the Secretary to determine compliance with the
provisions of the marketing order.22 5 Additional information may
be required by the Secretary to determine "whether or not there has
been any abuse of the privilege of exemptions from the antitrust
226

laws".

Any handler subject to an order may file a petition with the Secretary of Agriculture stating that the order or any provision of the
order or any obligation imposed on the handler pursuant to the
order is not in accordance with law, and tbereupon the handler shall
2 27
be given a hearing with respect to the contentions in his petition.
The regulations require that the petition shall state, inter alia, all
the grounds "on which the terms or provisions of the order, or the
interpretation or application thereof, which are complained of, are
challenged as not in accordance with law," and the petition shall be
filed with the Hearing Clerk in the United States Department of
Agriculture. s2 8 An answer shall be filed to the petition, and the
223. Head Money Cases, 112 US. 580, 595-596 (1884).

See also, Hamilton

v. Dillin, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 73, 90-97 (1874) ; Varney v. Warehime, 147 F. 2d
238, 245 (6th Cir. 1945), certiorari denied, 325 U.S. 882 (1945); Combs v.
United States, 98 F. Supp. 749, 754-756 (D. Vermont 1951).
224. United States v. Levine, 129 F. 2d 745, 747-748 (2d Cir. 1942).
225. United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U. S. 287, 288-289, 293 (1946); United
States v. Turner Dairy Co., 162 F. 2d 425, 425-428 (7th Cir. 1947), certiorari
denied, 332 U.S. 836 (1947); United States v. Turner Dairy Co., 166 F. 2d
1, 1-5 (7th Cir. 1948), certioraridenied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948) ; Panno v. United
States, 203 F. 2d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1953). Record-keeping and reporting requirements are, in general, valid provisions in Acts providing for the regulation
of commerce. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 221 U.S.
612, 620-623 (1911); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647-654
(1950); Rodgers v. United States, 138 F. 2d 992, 994-996 (6th Cir. 1943);
Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. 2d 350, 351-353 (7th Cir. 1933).
226. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608d(1).
227. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(15) (A). This proceeding is "adjudicatory"
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1001(d), 1006,
and 1007. Many petitions have been filed by handlers, and the decisions of
the Secretary are published in Agriculture Decisions. This section of the
Act has been given a broad interpretation so as to enable handlers to submit
all relevant controversies to the Secretary of Agriculture. A claim by a
handler, for a diversion allowance, against the producer-settlement fund
under a milk order has been regarded as an appropriate matter for hearing
and adjudication under this section of the Act. Grandview Dairy v. Jones, 157
F. 2d 5 (2d Cir. 1946), certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946).
228. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.52(b) (3) (Rev. 1952).
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hearing shall be conducted by a Hearing Examiner under the Administrative Procedure Act.229 The hearing is an adversary proceeding, and all relevant evidence, oral or written, may be adduced
at the hearing, and the Hearing Examiner may issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, records, and other documentary evidence.2, 0 Subsequent to the hearing, the Hearing Examiner shall prepare and file
with the Hearing Clerk the proposed findings of fact, conclusions,
and order, and the report shall be filed with the Hearing Clerk and
23
copies shall be served by the Hearing Clerk on each of the parties. '
Exceptions may be filed to the report within the time specified under
the regulations, and the Hearing Examiner may revise his report in the
light of the exceptions.2 32 The entire record is then transmitted to
the Secretary for final decision.233 As soon as practicable after
the receipt of the record from the Hearing Clerk, or in case argument is bad as soon as practicable thereafter, the Secretary shall
prepare and file with the Hearing Clerk his final decision in the
proceeding, and this decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law.23 4 The final decision or order shall be served upon
23 5
the parties.
The statute provides for judicial review of the ruling of the
Secretary.236 If the United States District Court, in which review
is appropriately sought, determines that the ruling by the Secretary
is not in accordance with the law, the Court may remand the proceeding with directions to the Secretary to make such ruling as the
Court determines is in accordance with law or to take such further
proceedings as in the Court's opinion the law requires.2 3 7 The scope
of judicial review, with respect to the Secretary's findings, is limited
229.
230.
231.
232.

7 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 900.52(c) (3), 900.52a, and 900.55 (Rev. 1952).
7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.55(c) (Rev. 1952).
7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.64(c) (Rev. 1952).
7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.64(e) (Rev. 1952).

233. The Judicial Officer may act for the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant
to authority delegated (10 Fed. Reg. 13769, 18 Fed. Reg. 3648) under the

Act of April 4, 1940, c. 75, 54 STAT. 81, 5 U.S.C. § 516a et seq., which pro-

vides that whenever a delegation is made under the statute "all provisions of

law shall be construed as if the regulatory function or the part thereof dele-

gated had (to the extent of the delegation) been vested by law in the individual
to whom the delegation is made, instead of in the Secretary of Agriculture".
For several years, all of the decisions in adjudicatory proceedings under this
Act have been made by the Judicial Officer.
234. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.67 (Rev. 1952).

235. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 900.67 (Rev. 1952).
236. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(15) (B). On judicial review of an administrative order to ascertain whether it is "in accordance with law," constitutional
issues as well as other issues may be presented. Oklahoma v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 138-140 (1947).
237. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(15) (B).
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to inquiry as to whether substantial evidence, on the record as a
whole, supports the findings by the Secretary.2 38
The statutory proceeding, before the administrative agency, whereby a handler may challenge the validity of a marketing order, a
provision in the order, or any obligation imposed on him under
the order, "is exclusive".2 3 9 It is a "long settled rule of judicial
administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy
has been exhausted".2 40 This doctrine involves a policy of orderly
procedure which favors a preliminary administrative sifting process.2 41 It is particularly desirable with respect to matters peculiarly
within the competence of an administrative authority24 2 or where
uniformity is essential for purposes of the regulatory statute.24 3
In United States v. Ruzicka,24 4 an enforcement action arising under

this statute, the issue was whether a handler may resist in District
Court a claim against him without previously having sought to challenge the claim by means of the administrative remedy defined in
the Act. In holding that the administrative remedy provided for
by the statute is the exclusive avenue for challenging the validity of
the obligation imposed on the handler, it was said:
To be sure, Congress did not say in words that, in a proceeding under § 8a(6) [of the Act] to enforce an order, a handier
may not question an obligation which flows from it. But meaning, though not explicitly stated in words, may be imbedded in
a coherent scheme. And such we find to be the provisions taken
in their entirety, as a means for attaining the purposes of the
Act while at the same time protecting adequately the interests
of individual handlers...
. . . Failure by handlers to meet their obligations promptly
would threaten the whole scheme. Even temporary defaults
238. Ogden Dairy Co. v. Wickard, 157

F. 2d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1946);

Wawa Dairy Farms v. Wickard, 149 F. 2d 860, 862 (3rd Cir. 1945)

Wickard, 137 F. 2d 406, 409 (6th Cir. 1943).

; Crull v.

239. United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 292 (1946); LaVerne Co-op
Citrus Ass'n v. United States, 143 F. 2d 415, 418 (9th Cir. 1944).
240. Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
241. Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174 (1925).
242. Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 311 (1937).
243. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 139-140 (1939).
Also see Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Company, 204 U.S. 426,
439-448 (1907); Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 342-343 (1937);
Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 404 (1940); Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544-545 (1946); Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v.
Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767-769 (1947).
244. 329 U.S. 287 (1946).
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by some handlers may work unfairness to others, encourage
wider non-compliance, and engender those subtle forces of doubt
and distrust which so readily dislocate delicate economic arrangements. To make the vitality of the whole arrangement
depend on the contingencies and inevitable delays of litigation,
no matter how alertly pursued, is not a result to be attributed
to Congress . . .That Congress avoided such hazards for its
policy is persuasively indicated by the procedure it devised for
the careful administrative and judicial consideration of a handler's grievance... Ma
Criminal sanctions are imposed by the statute,2 45 and any person
wilfully exceeding any quota or allotment shall forfeit to the United
States a sum equal to three times the current market value of such
excess, and a forfeiture is recoverable in a civil suit brought in the
name of the United States.246 In a criminal proceeding in which a
defendant is charged with having violated the requirements of a
regulatory program under the statute, the administrative order is
presumptively valid and the defendant who failed to avail himself
of the administrative remedy for testing the validity of the program
or the obligation imposed on him is precluded in the criminal case
from asserting the invalidity of the program or the invalidity of the
obligation imposed on the defendant.2 47 That principle has been
applied in various cases, 248 and its application has precluded a defendant from urging the invalidity on constitutional grounds of certain administrative action.2 9
A defendant in a criminal proceeding may on default of the payment of the fine imposed on the defendant be remitted to the custody
of the Attorney General until the fine is paid or the defendant is
otherwise discharge in due course of law.P 0 A partnership may be
a handler under a marketing order, and the partnership and the in244a. Id. at 292-3.

245. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 608a (4) and 608c(14).

246. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608a (5).

It has been held under a treble damage

provision in another statute that an action for treble damages does not survive the death of the person charged with the violation. Bowles v. Farmers
Nat. Bank of Lebanon, 147 F. 2d 425, 428-430 (6th Cir. 1945).
247. Panno v. United States, 203 F. 2d 504, 508-509 (9th Cir. 1953).
248. See, e. g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 427-443 (1944);
United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 439-440 (1936); White v. Johnson,
282 U.S. 367, 373-374 (1931); Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U.S. 477, 485 (1913).
249. Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U.S. 477, 485 (1913).
250. Panno v. United States, 203 F. 2d 504, 508-510 (9th Cir. 1953). See
also, Hill v. United States, ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 463 (1936); Boyd
v. Archer, 42 F. 2d 43, 43-44 (9th Cir. 1930).
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and may be fined
dividual partners are subject to criminal sanctions
25
separately for violating the regulatory program. '
A marketing order is not applicable to any producer in his capacity
as a producer 2 52 But producers may, in some circumstances, have
such an interest in the operations of a marketing order as to be able
to challenge the validity of the program, or a provision in the marketing order, by a proceeding in court. It has been held that dairy
farmers have a sufficient interest in the producer-settlement fund
under a marketing order with respect to milk that the dairy farmers
may in a proceeding in court assert the invalidity of a provision in
the marketing order whereby certain deductions are made from the
producer-settlement fund prior to the final computation of the uni3
form blended price to be paid to producers for their milk.2 5

Numerous statutory provisions, e. g., for arbitration and mediation,2 4 and some of the regulatory requirements are not within the
compass of this article.

III.
(1)

The Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, provides in general for
the regulation of the marketing of livestock at stockyards

posted by the Secretary of Agriculture; (2) the regulation of the
marketing of live poultry at live poultry markets designated by the
Secretary of Agriculture, and (3) the regulation of the business
activities of meat packers engaged in "commerce" as defined in the
Act.2 55 The statute is within the power of Congress under the
Constitution to regulate commerce,2 56 and the broad purpose of the
original enactment and the applicability of the Act to the flow of
2 57
commerce are reviewed in Stafford v. Wallace.

The statute prohibits (1) unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practices by stockyard owners, market agencies, and dealers
251. Panno v. United States, 203 F. 2d 504, 508-509 (9th Cir. 1953).
In determining the meaning of an Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise, the word "person" includes a partnership as well as individuals.
1 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1.
252. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 608c(13) (B).
253. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 302-311 (1944); Brannan v. Stark,
342 U.S.451 (1952).
254. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 671.
255. 42 STAT. 159 (1921) as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 181 et seq.
Numerous provisions in the Act and the regulations, particularly the details
of the regulatory requirements, are not within the limits of this article.
256. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 513-528 (1922); Tagg Bros. v.
United States, 280 U.S. 420, 436-439 (1930); Farmers' Livestock Commission
Co. v. United States, 54 F. 2d 375, 378 (E.D. Ill. 1931) ; Trunz Pork Stores v.
Wallace, 70 F. 2d 688, 689-690 (2d Cir. 1934); 0. V. Handy Bros. Co. v.
Wallace, 16 F. Supp. 662, 664-666 (E.D. Pa. 1936) ; Nostrand Poultry Market,
v.United States, 59 F. Supp. 245, 247-248 (3-judge Court, E.D. N. Y. 1945).
257. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
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at posted stockyards, 2 58 (2) unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practices by live poultry licensees at designated markets,2 5 9
(3) unjust and unreasonable rates for stockyard services, at posted
stockyards, and services and facilities in connection with the marketing of live poultry at designated markets,2 60 and (4) unfair, unjustly
261
discriminatory, deceptive, or monopolistic practices by packers.
The statute requires (1) livestock market agencies and dealers operating at posted stockyards to register with the Secretary of Agriculture and, under the regulations, submit bonds, 2 62 and (2) live poultry
dealers or handlers, operating at designated live poultry markets, to
be licensed by the Secretary.2 68 The statute authorizes the Secretary
(1) to issue cease and desist orders against violators of the Act after
notice and hearing,264 (2) to prescribe reasonable rates for services
and facilities furnished by stockyard owners, market agencies, and
live poultry licensees, 26 5 (3) to order payment by persons subject to
the Act of reparations for damages resulting from certain violations
of the Act,26 6 and (4) to suspend or revoke registrations and licenses.26 7 The regulations under the Act set forth numerous requirements with respect to the various proceedings and activities

pursuant to the statute.2 68 The Secretary is also empowered to authorize a brand inspection agency in any State, where branding

prevails, to inspect brands of livestock from such State at posted
stockyards and to charge fees for the inspection, and to suspend
269
and, after hearings, revoke any such authorization.
The term "livestock," as defined in the Act, means cattle, sheep,
swine, horses, mules, or goats.270 The term "stockyard," as defined
in the statute, means any place, establishment, or- facility commonly
known as a stockyard, conducted or operated for compensation or
profit as a public market, consisting of pens or other inclosures and
their appurtenances, in which live cattle, sheep, swine, horses, mules,
258. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 205, 208, 211, 212, 213.
259. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 218a, 218b, 218c.
260. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. H§ 206, 207, 212, 217a, 218c.
261. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 192.
262. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 203, 204; 9 Code Fed. Regs. § 201.27 et seq.
(1949 ed.).
263. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 218a.
264. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 193, 211, 213, 217a, 218c.
265. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. H9 207, 211, 217a, 218c.
266. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 209, 210, 218c.
267. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. H9 204, 205, 217a, 218d.
268. 9 Code Fed. Regs. H9 201.1 et seq. and 202.1 et seq. (1949 ed.). The
regulations include, inter alia, the rules of practice applicable to disciplinary
proceedings, rate proceedings, and reparation proceedings under the Act.
269. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 217a.
270. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 182(4). The definition includes livestock "whether
live or dead".
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or goats are received, held, or kept for sale or shipment in commerce,
but the term does not apply to a stockyard in which the area normally
available for handling livestock, exclusive of runs, alleys, or passageways, is less than 20,000 square feet.2 71 The Secretary is directed
to ascertain, after such inquiry as he deems necessary, the stockyards
which come within the definition of that term in the Act; and if the
Secretary determines that a particular stockyard is within the statutory definement, notice of such determination shall be given to the
stockyard owner or owners concerned and to the public, and thereafter the marketing of livestock at such stockyard is subject to the
2 72
regulatory terms of the Act.

The Act prohibits a person from carrying on the business of a
market agency or dealer at a posted stockyard unless he is registered
with the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the provisions
of the statute and the regulations. 2 73 "The Act does not require
that a dealer in order to come under the Act be engaged in the sole
2 74
business of buying or selling livestock" at a posted stockyard.
An isolated transaction may not be enough to bring a person within
the ambit of the Act, but transactions which chart a well-defined
course of business, at a posted stockyard, are adequate to warrant
the conclusion that the person engaging in the transactions is engaging in the business of buying or selling livestock at a posted
stockyard.2 75 In every case the totality of the facts is to be considered and appraised. The significant words of the Act are similar
to the language in another statute under which it was held that
"the words of the statute ...

are not phrases of art with a change-

less connotation," but "[t]hey have a color and a content that may
'2 76
vary with the setting.
A person who carries on the business of a market agency or
dealer at a posted stockyard without having registered as required
by the Act is subject to a penalty which shall accrue to the United
271. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 202(a).
272. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 202(b).
273. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 203; 9 Code Fed. Regs. § 201.10 et seq. (1949 ed.).

The term "market agency" means any person engaged in the business of
(1) buying or selling in commerce livestock at a posted stockyard on a commission basis, or (2) furnishing stockyard services. The term "dealer" means
any person not a market agency engaged in the business of buying or selling
livestock at a posted stockyard either on his own account or as an employee
or agent of the vendor or purchaser. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 201(c) and (d).
274. Kelley v. United States, 202 F. 2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1953).
275. Ibid. Compare United States v. Roberts & Oake, 65 F. 2d 630, 631-632
(7th Cir. 1933), in which it was held that a packer is not a dealer under the
Act, with Kelley v. United States, 202 F. 2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1953).
276. First National Bank v. Beach, 301 U.S. 435, 437, 440-441 (1937). See
also, Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 446-447 (1947).
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States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the United
States.2 77 Market agencies and dealers are required to submit reasonable bonds to secure the performance of their obligations, and if
the Secretary finds after notice and hearing that a market agency
or dealer is insolvent or has violated any provision of the Act, the
Secretary may issue an order suspending such registrant for a rea27 8
sonable period.
Schedules of rates at posted stockyards must be filed with the
Secretary, and either upon his own initiative or upon the basis of
a complaint the Secretary may, after a Teasonable notice, initiate
a hearing to determine the lawfulness of a rate, and a proposed rate
2 79
may be suspended for not more than 60r days pending the hearing.
The Secretary may, after the full hearing, prescribe reasonable rates
if he determines that the schedule of rates on file is unreasonable.2 80
The rates are determined by the Secretary and are reviewed by the
courts upon the hearing record before the Secretary.2 81 The issuance of rate orders is subject to the requirements of the Act, the
regulations pursuant to the Act, and the Administrative Procedure
282
Act.
The Secretary is authorized, inter alia, to exercise the following
adjudicatory functions under the Act upon condition that his action
be based upon the record of an agency hearing: (1) The registration of any market agency or dealer may be suspended and a ceaseand-desist order may be issued against any market agency or dealer
for failure to render reasonable stockyard service, for engaging in
the unfair practices prohibited by the Act, or for charging rates
other than those filed with or prescribed by the Secretary; (2) a
cease-and-desist order may be issued against any packer who has
engaged in any unfair and discriminatory practice; (3) a license
277. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 203.
278. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 204. Cella v. United States, No. 10744, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, decided on December
2, 1953, affirmed the authority of the Secretary or Judicial Officer to suspend
the registration of a dealer who has violated the Act.
279. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 207 and 211.
280. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 211.
281. Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426, 434 (1936). See also, St. Joseph
Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 50-54 (1936); Tagg Bros. v.
United States, 280 U.S. 420, 442-445 (1930).
282. The rules of practice applicable to rate proceedings are in 9 Code Fed.
Regs. § 202.23 et seq. (1949 ed.). The hearing is under 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed.
§§ 1006, 1007, and 1010. See also, Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 472482 (1936) ; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 13-22 (1938) ; United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 413-422 (1941). "The proceedings before the Secretary 'has a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding'," and the administrative agency and the courts are "collaborative instruments of justice
and the appropriate independence of each should be respected by the other." 313
U.S. at 422.
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may be refused to any live poultry dealer or handler who (a) within
a period of two years prior to the application has engaged in practices
of the nature prohibited by the Act or (b) is financially unable to
fulfill the obligations that he would incur as a licensee; and (4) a
license of a live poultry dealer or handler may be suspended or re2 83
voked if the licensee has engaged in a practice prohibited by the Act.
The United States Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to
enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the
validity of all "final orders"28 4 of the Secretary under the Packers and
Stockyards Act, except a reparation order under 7 U.S.C. § 210(e)
or an order under 7 U.S.C. § 217a. 85 The venue of any proceeding in a court of appeals to review an order of the Secretary shall
be in the judicial circuit "wherein is the residence of the party or
any of the parties filing the petition for review, or wherein such party
or any of such parties has its principal office, or in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia". 28 6 A petition for
review must be filed by the aggrieved party within 60 days after the
entry of the order by the administrative agency.2 87 The hearing
record before the administrative agency must be certified to the ap2 88
pellate court.
Reparation orders by the Secretary under the Packers and Stockyards Act may be the subject of suit in a United States District
Court.28 9 If the defendant does not comply with an order for the
payment of money within the time limit of such order, the complainant in a reparation proceeding may within one year of the date of
the administrative order file in the United States District Court for
the district in which the complainant resides, or in which is located
the principal place of business of the defendant, or in any State court
283. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 193, 204, 211(b), 213, 218a(b), 218d. The authori-

ty of the Secretary with respect to regulatory functions under the Act has
been delegated to the Judicial Officer. 10 Fed. Reg. 13769, 18 Fed. Reg. 3648.
All of the regulatory decisions in recent years have been made by the Judicial
Officer. These proceedings are under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1001 et seq., except reparation proceedings which are reviewed
de novo in court.

284. A "final order," under this statutory provision, need not necessarily
be the very last order, and finality is not dependent upon the label affixed to
its action by an administrative agency. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, No.
11,679, in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, decided on January 21, 1954. An administrative order is ordinarily
reviewable if it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process. Ibid.
285. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1032.

286.
287.
288.
289.

5 U.S.C.
5 U.S.C.
5 U.S.C.
7 U.S.C.

1952 ed.
1952 ed.
1952 ed.
1952 ed.

§ 1033.
§ 1034.
§ 1036.
§ 210(f).
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having general jurisdiction of the parties, a petition setting forth
briefly the causes for which he claims damages, and the order of the
Secretary in the reparation proceeding.2 90 The action in court shall
proceed in all respects like all other civil suits for damages except
that the findings and order of the Secretary "shall be prima face
evidence of the facts therein stated," and if the petitioner finally
prevails he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed
and collected as a part of the costs of the suit.291
Any stockyard owner, market agency, livestock dealer, or live poultry dealer or handler who violates the regulatory requirements relative to services, rates, or practices is liable to the person or persons
injured thereby "for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of such violation," and the liability may be enforced "either
(1) by complaint to the Secretary... or (2) by suit in any district
,,292
court of the United States of competent jurisdiction ....
The Secretary, however, has primary jurisdiction to determine what
are the discriminatory practices which are prohibited by the Act,
and the courts are without jurisdiction in this respect in the absence
of a prior complaint to the Secretary and a hearing and decision
thereon by the Secretary.29 3 This interpretation of the Act is based
upon Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,2 94 which established the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in an administrative
agency under statutory terminology similar to that in the Packers
and Stockyards Act. "To say, however, that the primary jurisdiction doctrine is applicable to cases arising under the Packers and
Stockyards Act is not to say that it applies to defeat the jurisdiction
of the courts in all such cases, for the Supreme Court has clearly
indicated that the doctrine is operative only in certain classes of
cases, those in which 'the inquiry is essentially one of fact and of
discretion in technical matters; and uniformity can be secured only
29 5
if its determination is left' " to the administrative agency.
Criminal sanctions are provided for by the Act with respect to
violations of certain administrative orders and statutory provisions,2 95
297
and the Act also provides for civil penalties.
290. Ibid.
291. Ibid.
292. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 209 and 218c.
293. Kelly v. Union Stockyards & Transit Co., 190 F. 2d 860, 861-864 (7th
Cir. 1951).
294. 204 U.S.426, 439-448 (1907).
295. Kelly v. Union Stockyards & Transit Co., 190 F. 2d 860, 864 (7th
Cir. 1951). Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291
(1922) supports this principle which was applied in Kelly v. Union Stockyards
& Transit Co., supra.
296. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 195, 207(h), 218a, 221, 222; 15 U.S.C. 1952 ed.
§ 50.
297. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 203, 207(g), and 215(a). See also, United States
v. Donahue Bros., 59 F. 2d 1019, 1020-1022 (8th Cir. 1932).
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There were 325 stockyards posted under the provisions of this
Act as of June 30, 1953, and on that date 4,965 active livestock
market agencies and dealers were registered under the terms of the
Act.2 9 8 There were 1,365 poultry sales agencies licensed under the
statute as of June 30, 1953, and on that date there were 16 live
poultry marketing areas designated under the Act.2 99 There were
1,914 meat packers subject to the provisions of the Act on June 30,
1953.300 Bonds on file by registrants under the Act to assure payment for livestock purchased or sold totaled approximately $44,000,000 on June 30, 1953.801
IV.
The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, is designed
to suppress unfair and fraudulent practices in the marketing, in interstate or foreign commerce, of fresh fruits and fresh vegetables,
whether or not frozen or packed in ice.302 The Act "was passed
by Congress in the exercise of its power under the commerce clause
to facilitate the free flow of perishable agricultural commodities . . .
by regulating . . . commerce through the licensing of commission

merchants, dealers, and brokers engaged in it and the prohibiting of
various kinds of unfair conduct which in the past had proved to be
productive of serious disputes and difficulties obstructive to the free
flow of these essential commodities". 303 A cardinal purpose of the
Act is to make it "difficult for unscrupulous persons to take advantage of shippers by wrongful rejection of the goods upon arrival
at a point where it is expensive and impracticable for the shipper to
enforce his legal rights". 30 4
298. Report of the Administrator of the Production and Marketing Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1953, p. 52.
299. Ibid. and Report of the Solicitor, United States Department of Agriculture, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953, p. 8.
300. Report of the Administrator of the Production and Marketing Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1953, p. 52.
301. Ibid.
302. 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499a et seq.
The statute is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce.
Krueger v. Acme Fruit Co., 75 F. 2d 67, 68 (5th Cir. 1935).
303. Rothenberg v. H. Rothstein & Sons, 183 F. 2d 524, 526 (3rd Cir. 1950).
304. LeRoy Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161 F. 2d 152, 156 (4th Cir. 1947). The Act
"was intended to prevent produce from becoming distress merchandise and to
protect sellers who often were at a great distance from the buyer." L. Gillarde
Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co., 169 F. 2d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1948), certioraridenied, 335 U.S. 885 (1948).
In addition to a shipper's right to reparation,
under the Act, for wrongful rejection of perishable agricultural commodities,
inspection service is available at designated markets, as well as at shipping
points, and an application for appeal inspection may be made under the regulations. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 51.4 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1952).
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Every commission merchant, dealer, or broker who engages in the
business of marketing perishable agricultural commodities, as defined
in the Act, is required to be licensed in accordance with the Act and
the regulations. 305 A penalty for operating without a license is imposed by the statute.30 6 In addition, the Act (1) requires licensees
to keep records of transactions; (2) prohibits improper practices or
unfair conduct, e. g., makes it unlawful (a) for a dealer to reject
or fail to deliver perishable agricultural commodities, in accordance
with the terms of the contract, "without reasonable cause" or (b) for
a commission merchant to discard, dump, or destroy "without reasonable cause" any perishable agricultural commodity; (3) requires
correct and prompt accounting and payment; (4) authorizes the investigation of complaints, the issuance of reparation orders, the
publication of facts concerning violations; and (5) authorizes, on
the record made at an agency hearing, the refusal, suspension, or
30 7
revocation of a license.
In adjudicatory proceedings 308 under the Act, the Secretary may
take the following action upon evidence adduced at a hearing: (1) Refuse to issue a license if he finds any of the grounds enumerated in the
statute, e. g., that the applicant has failed, except in case of bankruptcy, to pay within the time limit provided therein any reparation
award which has been issued, within two years, against the applicant;
(2) suspend a license for 90 days if he finds that the licensee has
violated the Act or any regulations thereunder, and revoke the license if the violation is flagrant or repeated; and (3) revoke the
license of any person who after having been given a 30-day notice
continues to employ in a responsible position any individual whose
license was revoked or who was responsibly connected with a firm
whose license was revoked. 309
Any commission merchant, dealer, or broker who violates the provisions of the Act is liable in damages to the person or persons in305. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499c; 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 46.4 et seq. (1949 ed.).
Numerous regulatory provisions in the Act, particularly the details of the
general plan of regulation, are not within the limits of this article.

306. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499c.
307. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 499b, 499d, 499f, 499g, 499h, 499i, and 499m. Regulations and Rules of Practice have been issued under the statute. 7 Code Fed.
Regs. § 46.1 et seq. (1949 ed.) and 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 47.1 et seq. (1949 ed.).
308. The adjudicatory proceedings referred to in this paragraph are under
§§ 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1006
and 1007. The authority of the Secretary in rogatory proceedings has been
delegated to the Judicial Officer. 10 Fed. Reg. 13769, 18 Fed. Reg. 3648.
309. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 499d, 499h; 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 47.26 et seq.
(1949 ed.).
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jured thereby, and the liability may be enforced "either (1) by complaint to the Secretary ... or (2) by suit in any court of competent
jurisdiction; but this section shall not in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, and the
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies".3 10 Under
the reparation provisions of the Act, the Secretary entertains complaints for damages, makes investigations, holds hearings, or receives
written submissions of evidence, makes findings of fact and rulings
of law, and issues reparation orders on the basis of his findings and
conclusions.3 11 A party ordered to pay reparations must within 30
days from the date of the order either make the required payment
or file an appeal in the United States District Court for the district
in which the hearing was held. a12 Failure to appeal or to pay the
reparation award within the time allowed results in automatic suspension of the respondent's license. 813 A reparation award, under
the statute, is not a judgment upon which execution may be had,
and the suspension of the respondent's license is the administrative
sanction for non-compliance. The Act provides, however, for judicial review of a reparation proceeding, and suit for that purpose
may be instituted in a United States District Court, or an action to
enforce liability may be filed in a United States District Court or
8 14
in any State court having general jurisdiction of the parties.
The action in court proceeds in all respects like other civil proceedings for damages, i. e., it is tried de novo, except that "the findings
and orders of the Secretary" are "prima fade evidence of the facts
310. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499e. This statutory language is similar to that
in another regulatory statute which was interpreted in Kelly v. Union Stockyards & Transit Co., 190 F. 2d 860, 861-864 (7th Cir. 1951).
311. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 499f and 499g. The rules of practice set forth
the procedure to be followed in a reparation proceeding, including the method
of instituting the proceeding, the service of the complaint and answer, the
taking of evidence, the post-hearing procedure, the final decision, and the

grounds for re-hearing. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 47.6 et seq. (1949 ed.). Where
the amount of damages claimed does not exceed $500, an oral hearing shall
not be held, unless deemed necessary by the administrative agency or unless
granted by the Examiner on application of the complainant or respondent setting forth the peculiar circumstances which make an oral hearing necessary
for a proper presentation of the case. 7 Code Fed. Regs. § 47.15 (1949 ed.).
If an oral hearing is not held, the parties may submit, in accordance with the
regulations, their evidence in documentary or written form, under oath. 7
Code Fed. Regs. § 47.20 (1949 ed.). Stipulations of fact may also be submitted.
Ibid. The reparation proceedings may be reviewed de izovo by the United States
District Court (7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499g (c) ) and, therefore, the reparation
proceedings before the Secretary are exempt from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1004).
312. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499g(c).
313. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499g(d).
314. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499g(b) and (c). Venue is determined by the criteria in the statute. Ibid.
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therein stated". 315 If the petitioner finally prevails in court he is
entitled to be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed and
3 16
collected as a part of the costs of the suit.
The Act does not abrogate or nullify any other statute, whether
State or Federal, dealing with the same subject matter, except insofar
as any other statutory provision is antithetical or repugnant to the
Act. 3 17 It has been held, therefore, that "while the validity of contracts to sell perishable agricultrral commodities in interstate commerce is to be determined by the federal act and the regulations
issued under it to the extent that they are applicable, the law of the
state the rules of which would be applicable under the conflict of
laws continues to be applicable to the determination of the question
of validity to the extent that the federal act and regulations do not
provide a rule for its solution". 318 Accordingly, if the applicable
state Statute of Frauds has the substantive effect of rendering a
parol contract wholly void it would have the same effect upon a
contract to which it was applicable relative to the sale of perishable
agricultural commodities in interstate commerce.3 19 But a state
Statute of Frauds which is procedural only, and not substantive, is
inapplicable in an action, in a United States District Court, based
320
on the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.
Except with respect to reparation orders, all "final orders" under
the Act are subject to review in the United States Court of Appeals
for the judicial circuit in which the petitioner on appeal resides or
has his principal office or, in the alternative, judicial review may
be had in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.3 2' The hearing record before the administrative agency is
certified to the appellate court in the event of an appeal,32 2 and judicial review follows the familiar pattern in adjudicatory proceedings.
In addition to formal decisions by the Department in rogatory
315. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499g(b) and (c).

See, e. g., A. E. Barker & Co.

v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 100 F. 2d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1939); Wesco Foods Co. v.
De Mase, 194 F. 2d 918 919 (3rd Cir. 1952); Smith v. White, 48 F. Supp. 554,

556-557 (E.D. Mo. 19425.
316. Ibid.
317. 7 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 499o, Hartford Indemnity

155, 158-159 (1936).

Co.

v. Illinois, 298 U.S.

318. Rothenberg v. H. Rothstein & Sons, 183 F. 2d 524, 526 (3rd Cir. 1950).

319. Id. at 527.

320. Id. at 527-528. The rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), in an action based on diversity of citizenship, is inapplicable in a proceding based on the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act. Rothenberg v.

H. Rothstein & Sons, 183 F. 2d 524, 528 (3rd Cir. 1950).
321. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. §§ 1032 and 1033.

Only "final orders" are reviewable.

Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, No. 11,679, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, decided on January 21, 1954.
322. 5 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 1036.
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proceedings under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, the
Department's explanatory and mediative efforts are conducive to the
settlement of many disputes or controversies relative to the marketing of perishable agricultural commodities. 32 3 Almost one-half of
the reparation complaints during the fiscal year ending June 30,
1953, were settled, as a result of the Department's efforts, without
the necessity of formal decisions. 82

323.

Report of the Administrator of the Production and Marketing Adminis-

tration, United States Department of Agriculture, for the Fiscal Year Ending
June 30, 1953, p. 32.
324. Ibid.
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